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Abstract 
 
Rapid development of technologies and fast digitalization of all spheres of life around the 
globe increased the importance of providing cyber security at all levels. For example, in 
2016 Ukraine was a target for around 7000 cyber attacks targeted at the state’s critical 
infrustructure, as well as a big number of cyber crimes, according to the government. 
(Poroshenko, 2017).  The growing importance of tackling cyber crimes, events of cyber 
terrorism, cyber espionage and attacks makes countries and organizations develop new 
approaches to providing security. One of such approach is cyber resilience, which 
focuses among others on the inclusion of different actors into the process of confronting 
cyber threats in order to efficiently and quickly tackle and recover from those same cyber 
threats. This research contributes to the theoretical and conceptual understanding of cyber 
resilience as a new approach to addressing cyber threats. It also looks at the national 
strategy in cyber security of Ukraine with the aim to explain the process of its 
development and change and define the challenges it faces.   
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Introduction and methodology 
 
During the NATO Warsaw summit on 8 July 2016 cyberspace was named as a fifth 
element of warfare along with air, space, sea and land. The growing importance of 
tackling cyber crimes, events of cyber terrorism, cyber espionage and attacks makes 
countries and organizations develop new approaches to providing security. ‘The world of 
cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism, and cyber-warfare is truly a wild, unruly, and ungoverned 
place’ (Tohn, 2009:17). Since threats connected to cyber dimension are mainly of 
international character and require global response, cyber security issues become more 
visible within the scope of the international security agenda. Furthermore, it is widely 
agreed by experts that security which presumes the absence of threats is impossible to 
achieve in cyber space (Tohn, 2009:17; Kaminski, 2010). Therefore, other approaches 
that look at preventing and combating cyber threats are being developed. One of such 
approaches is cyber resilience which is focusing among others on inclusion of different 
actors into the process of confronting cyber threats in order to efficiently and quickly 
tackle and recover from cyber threats. The cyber resilience concept, which was firstly 
developed in IT, and only after was borrowed by political scientists, seems to be most 
promising and widely used by experts, political figures and media. The concept, however, 
is relatively new and not studied and tested sufficiently. This research aims to test the 
abovementioned concept using a single case study method and focusing on a national 
policy in cyber sphere of Ukraine. 
 
After the Euromaidan events and annexation of Crimea in 2014 Ukraine became a victim 
of a war with Russian Federation which has been taking place for already three years 
(Poroshenko, 2017). The conflict in Ukraine includes all means of cyber warfare such as 
Ddos attacks, digital propaganda, website defacements (Radchenko, 2017). Even though 
there were around 6000 cyber attacks targeted at Ukraine in 2014-2017 (Poroshenko, 
2017) the national policy in cyber sphere is still being developed. Due to the absence on 
the law on cyber security and no control mechanisms of other state regulations there is 
little coordination in state efforts aimed at tackling cyber threats. However, from 2014 
Ukraine experienced the rise of volunteerism and grass root movements which became 
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actively involved in providing cyber security of the country. Middle sized businesses and 
NGOs related to IT sphere provided their expertise and help to the state. These changes 
lead to the appearance of the new approach to cyber security of the country which has 
now more of bottom-up features focused on resilience rather than traditional cyber 
security. Cyber resilience concept is promising due to its flexibility and practical, realistic 
features. There is a need to provide a deep and thorough research of its application in 
different countries and on different levels. This research contributes to the study of cyber 
resilience as a new approach to addressing cyber threats. It also looks at the national 
strategy in cyber security of Ukraine with the aim to explain the process of its 
development and change and define the challenges it faces.  
a) Aim 
To find out if the national policy of Ukraine in cyber sphere corresponds to the concept of 
cyber resilience and identify main challenges to providing cyber resilience in the country. 
 
b) Added value  
 
From policy perspective, the attention to cyber security and cyber resilience is constantly 
growing within the recent years. However, both concepts are being used interchangeably 
and not consistently. Cyber security is often defined as ‘the state of being protected 
against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic data, or the measures taken to 
achieve this.’ (Oxford University Press, 2014). Cyber resilience at the same looks at the 
ways to ensure the quick and efficient recovery from cyber attacks and crimes be 
involving all possible tools and stakeholders’. Unlike cyber security, cyber resilience 
approach does not aim for achieving overall protection of cyber risks – it stresses that the 
risks are unavoidable and the efforts should be put into reducing their harm and quick 
recovery (Jegen, Merand, 2014). that Even though there are studies which look at cyber 
resilience and cyber security, the concepts are not researched to the full extent which 
leads to confusion and little understanding of their value. Therefore, both concepts 
require more in-depth academic research. Also, the Ukraine case study is specifically 
interesting and important due to the ongoing transformation which the country is going 
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through. Cyber domain reflected in the rapid development of ICT and e-democracy in the 
country is becoming increasingly important for Ukraine’s cooperation with the European 
Union. At the same time, the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine and fragile process of 
reforms undermines its cyber security. The state is currently being exposed to a wide 
range of cyber risks the research of which can significantly contribute to the theoretical 
and conceptual understanding of cyber security and cyber resilience in general. 
 
c) Research questions: 
 
Does the new policy of security in cyber space of Ukraine matches the concept of cyber 
resilience? 
 What are the main challenges for cyber security policy in Ukraine? 
 Can the policy on cyber security of Ukraine be explained through the concept of 
cyber resilience? 
 
d) Methodology and methods of data collection 
 
I will use a qualitative method to conduct my research – process tracing case study. This 
method was first introduced in 1979 and then thoroughly developed by George and 
Bennett in Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (2005). Process 
tracing is ‘a case-based approach to causal inference which focuses on the use of clues 
within a case (causal-process observations, CPOs) to adjudicate between alternative 
possible explanations’ (Mahoney, 2012: 9).  The main aim of the process tracing case 
study is to look at ‘establishing the causal mechanism, by examining the fit of a theory to 
the intervening causal steps. Theorists using process tracing ask’ how does “X” produce a 
series of conditions that come together in some way (or do not) to produce “Y”?’ 
(Wesleyan University, 2017). 
 
There were a few attempts to develop a cyber resilience concept in political science 
(Cavelty, 2015; Pernik, 2015; Christou, 2016; Nicholas, 2016; Jagasia, 2017) and by 
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looking at a case study of Ukraine I will trace the process of the development of its 
national policy in cyber sphere and will conclude if it fits in the theory. By using a 
process tracing case study I will then be able to test of the concept of cyber resilience 
viability using one of the cases. 
 
Process tracing focuses on a deep analysis of one case. Its form – theory testing case 
study is ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident’ (Benbasat and Zmud, 1999; 33).  
Thus, in order to use the process tracing case study as a research method the research 
design should correspond to the following principles:  
a. Investigate a contemporary phenomenon  
b. Exist in a real-life setting 
c. be focused on organizational and managerial (rather than technical) issues 
(Benbasat et al., 1987; Benbasat and Zmud, 1999) 
In this research, I am analyzing the contemporary events which have happened in 
Ukraine in 2014-2016 in cyber security policy. They take place in a real-life setting. The 
research is not focused on specific issues but relates to national policies in cyber sphere 
(organizational and managerial ones). 
             
Process tracing case study perfectly suits my research since I am looking at a single case 
(Ukraine) and test if the concept of cyber resilience can explain its cyber security policy 
and if not why. As philosopher A. Sayer pointed out: ‘within process tracing we would 
like a get knowledge of how the process works. Merely knowing that 'C' has generally 
been followed be 'E' is not enough; we want to understand the continuous process by 
which 'C' produced 'E,' if it did.’ (Sayer, 1992: 106-107). 
 
The process tracing is applied in four main steps within the scope of this research: 
1. Developing causal mechanisms which are broken down in parts which will be 
empirically measured. 
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2. Operationalizing causal mechanisms during which evidence which will prove if a 
causal mechanism exists in the case study  
3. Collecting evidence 
4. The conclusions of a process tracing exercise 
(Beach and Pedersen 2013) 
 
The causal mechanisms of this research consist of four independent variables (also called 
criteria), four elements which are to be proved by their factors and the dependent 
variable: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cyber security 
on a state level 
state organs efficiently 
cooperate and coordinate with 
each other to achieve cyber 
resilience on a national level 
 
Businesses 
providing cyber 
security 
businesses form public-private 
partnerships with the state to 
achieve cyber resilience on a 
national level 
cyber resilience on a 
national level 
Civil society 
focusing on 
cyber security 
vibrant civil society cooperates 
with state and works with 
people to achieve cyber 
resilience on a national level 
Cyber security 
awareness 
Cyber security education and 
general awareness is provided to 
people to achieve cyber 
resilience on a national level 
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Therefore, process tracing case study and its form – theory testing will help me to prove 
if national policy on cyber security in Ukraine can be explained though cyber resilience 
and if this concept is applicable in the case of Ukraine. Furthermore, though process 
tracing I will analyze the process of emerging and development of national policy in 
cyber security in Ukraine by looking at the process of development of national security 
policy as a whole. Therefore, the development of national policy in cyber security will act 
as a independent variable while cyber resilience on a national level is a dependent 
variable. 
 
e) The selection of a case study 
 
According to George and Bennett “the primary criterion for the case selection should be 
relevance to the research objective of the study, whether it includes theory development, 
theory testing, or heuristic purposes” (George and Bennett, 2005). The research includes 
the theory testing component and looks at proving if cyber resilience concept which is 
claimed to by many authors a new modern approach to cyber security and governance 
(Pernik, 2015) fits one of the European country which only recently started to develop its 
cyber security policy due to the cyber war with Russia. 
 
After the beginning of the war between Ukraine and Russia there was a rise of 
volunteering and grass root movements in Ukraine which aimed to support the 
government and people of Ukraine in providing cyber security. Small and medium sized 
businesses focusing on cyber security and IT became actively involved in providing 
expertise and help in cyber security as well. All these processes led to the appearance of 
the new approach to cyber security in Ukraine – cyber resilience. Cyber security as 
resilience has never been researched before in Ukraine. It is not used in official 
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documents on cyber security in Ukraine but its main features are presented in the country 
which makes Ukraine an interesting case to test the theory. 
 
Therefore, my selection of the case study of Ukrainian national policy in cyber security is 
based on the four main arguments: 
 There were only few attempts to analyze changes in cyber security policy in 
Ukraine. There has not been any comprehensive research on this topic so far. 
 Growing interest to cyber resilience in political science and its possible 
application in Ukraine.  
 Originality since cyber resilience is a relatively new approach to cyber security 
and governance in Ukraine and also worldwide. 
 Availability of sources and knowledge of national and local languages in Ukraine. 
Single case study rather than comparative one since it gives an opportunity to deeply 
research one case rather than focus on narrow comparisons. ‘A single case study also 
makes the writer to have a deeper understanding of the exploring subject’ (Gustafsson, 
2017).  Eisenhardt (1991) believes that the amount of a case studies depends upon how 
much new information the cases bring and how much is known. Since national policy in 
cyber security as resilience in Ukraine has been researched before this research brings a 
lot of new information itself. According to Gustafsson (2017) a single case study gives an 
opportunity to question different theoretical approaches related to the topic and test new 
ones which is the aim of this research. 
 
f) Availability of data: 
 
Within the framework of the research both primary and secondary data are analyzed. As 
to primary sources, one of the most crucial parts of the research will be the analysis of 
original documents, laws and regulations on Ukrainian national policy in cyber sphere. 
As to secondary sources, publications and articles, monographs and books specialized in 
resilience, cyber resilience and security will be analyzed. The following laws and 
regulations are constituting the basis of the primary sources used in the research:  
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 ‘Cyber security strategy of Ukraine’ (2016),  
 Draft law on ‘National cyber security’ (2016), 
 Law ‘On information security’ (2009),  
 ‘On National Security of Ukraine’ (2003), 
 ‘On State Special Communications Service and Information Security of Ukraine’ 
(2006), 
 ‘On Telecommunications’ (2003), 
 ‘On protection of information in telecommunication systems’(2014),  
 ‘On Access to Public information’(2011),’On Defense of Ukraine’(1991), 
 ‘On the principles of domestic and foreign policy’(2010).  
 
There are also Decrees of the President of Ukraine as well as decrees of Ukrainian 
government and National Security and Defense Council:  
 ‘Doctrine on information security’ (2009), 
 ‘Ukraine's National Security Strategy’ (2015)  
 ‘Military Doctrine of Ukraine’ (2015)  
 
Other documents and regulations released by organs which relate to cyber security issues 
such as: State service of special communication and information protection of Ukraine 
and its Department of cyber security together with CERT (Computer emergency response 
team); State Security Service; National Bank; Ministry of Defense; Ministry of foreign 
Defense. 
The case study is draws upon eighteen semi-structured interviews that were carried out 
with representatives of Ukrainian government and specialized agencies in ICT and 
security; NGOs, thinks tanks, grass-root movements, businesses. The following criteria of 
selecting the organizations and businesses were applied: 
 Number of projects, publications and other activities conducted 
 Regional distribution 
 Visibility in media 
 Credibility (possibility to verify the provided information) 
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 Well-established, consolidated status of the organization in Ukraine 
 
Interviews with international donors and organizations were also conducted since they 
play a crucial role in capacity building in cyber security in Ukraine as well as providing 
expertise to Ukrainian government. Such international organizations are interviewed: the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, Center of information and 
documentation of NATO in Ukraine, OSCE mission in Ukraine. Interviews with experts 
give the opportunity to look at opinion of civil society and businesses on Ukrainian 
policy in cyber security. Experts from the following NGOs, businesses and educational 
institutions are interviewed: the International Center for Defense and Security, ISACA 
(Information Systems Audit and Control Association), InfoSec Ukraine, Microsoft 
Ukraine, Berezha Security, Team4Ukraine, Atlantic Council, Cyber Shield NGO, 
Ukrainian Cyber forces, Cyber Warta NGO, Information security and informational 
technology association. Deputy Minister of Information of Ukraine and expert of 
National Institute of Strategic Studies are interviewed as representatives of government. 
‘The method of semi-structured interviews was chosen since it provides the interviewer 
flexibility by using open-ended questions and the possibility to ask for specifications or 
follow-up questions’ (May 2001). Names of the interviewees as well the list of topics and 
questions discussed with them are the listed under Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 
respectively. 
The interviews’ content was analyzed by textual analyses of the interview transcripts. 
Excel software tool is used for the purpose of conducting textual analysis. Highlighted 
topics and phrases discussed at the interview are uploaded to the Excel Sheet and grouped 
accordingly. When the themes were decided and the text grouped accordingly the write-
up process which included a narrative with the quotes of interviewees began. The themes 
which have been discussed with the interviewees were related to their involvement in 
providing cyber security in Ukraine, main challenges they faced during their work, 
cooperation and coordination with other stakeholders and governments on cyber security 
and finally the prospects of cyber resilience for Ukraine. Official documents, laws and 
regulations as well as critical literature were analyzed with the help of online textual 
analyses.  
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g) Limitations of the study 
In general, ‘Case study research and process tracing in particular face four main 
challenges: the reliance on pre-existing theories; the assumption that each case can be 
treated autonomously and that the cases are distinct from one another; the need for 
empirical data; and the pitfalls of cognitive biases’ (Collier and Mahoney, 2006; Checkel, 
2006: 367–9) As for the reliance on pre-existing theories arguments stresses on the fact 
that the empirical study often depends on an ill-fitted theory or the theory which is 
contested by academia to such extent that it should be rebuilt or reformulated. Some also 
argue that researches who use process tracing case study often select middle-range 
theories which consist of poorly formulated hypothesis rather than a working theory 
which has its set of guidelines to do a research. 
The assumption that cases are usually very different from each other relates to the fact 
that political science problematics are very interconnected. World becomes more global 
and interdependent. It is hard to prove that one specific case the researcher is analyzing is 
autonomous enough to be researched as a single case. As for the empirical sources on 
which process tracing case studies are dependent they should have a ‘sufficiently high 
level of accuracy, and reliability in order to work.’ However, again the question is here 
how the reliability and sufficiency of empirical data be evaluated and measured remains a 
question (Checkel, 2006: 366–7). 
Cognitive bias is the limitation which every social science`s research encounter. Very 
often researchers fail to notice negative evidences or the things which did not happen 
since they are harder to be analyzes than the existing events. Another example of the 
cognitive bias is the confirmation bias when the researcher tends to seek for specific 
information which confirms his or her believes rather than see the whole picture. This can 
affect all stages of the research – from collecting data to making conclusions. One more 
example of cognitive bias relates to theoretical bias (Venesson, 2012). The conclusions of 
the research may correspond to few theories or approaches and ‘then becomes difficult to 
assess whether alternative explanations are complementary or if some are just spurious’ 
(Njolstad 1990: 10). 
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The results of the research of one single case study contribute to the understanding of the 
trend comparatively little which is also a limitation of this research. The question here is 
where to place this research within the scope of debates on what cyber resilience stands 
for and what single case studies can show about the viability of this concept. This 
argument applies to ‘arguably most prominent critique of single case study analysis is the 
issue of external validity or generalizability’ (Willis, 2013: 16). 
Another limitation is conceptual. Academics, experts, government officials as well as 
interviewees of this research have different understanding of the concepts used in the 
research. This relates to every concept related to cyber sphere – difference on cyber 
attack and cybercrime, the point when the number of cyber attacks can or cannot be 
considered a cyber war and eventually the understanding of resilience and its features. 
Finally, limitation of the research also lies in the objectivity of the interviews. Selection 
of interviewees is highly dependent on their availability. 
h) Structure of the thesis 
The thesis will include an introduction to the problem, explanation of selected 
methodology, conceptualization and theoretical framework, empirical part, conclusion, 
bibliography and appendices. 
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Synopsis 
 
Having introduced the problem, defined the aim of the research and selected the 
methodology the research will start from the literature review and will be followed by the 
process tracing case study of Ukraine, conclusion, bibliography and appendices. 
Within the literature review the biggest cyber security risks and threats are identified in 
order to better define the challenges to providing cyber resilience on the national level. 
After the cyber threats and risks are overviewed the concepts of cyber security and cyber 
resilience are compared and defined. The last chapter of the literature review looks at 
national cyber security policies to identify possible and the most efficient approaches to 
forming and conducting national cyber security policies which integrate the ideas of 
cyber resilience. Literature review is followed by the short background chapter which 
looks at the history of Ukrainian cyber security policy.  
The process tracing begins within the empirical part of the research which aims to prove 
the four causal mechanisms developed in the methodology part. Each causal mechanism 
has one element which is analyzed by looking at different factors which confirms/ does 
not confirm it.  When all the four causal mechanisms are traced and either proved or not 
the research finishes with the conclusion which summarizes not only the results of 
process tracing but also defines the conceptual contribution of the research. Bibliography 
and appendices are provided at the end of the research. 
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Literature review 
 
2. Overview of main cyber risks to a country 
 
A resilience approach to security was developed through the merger of risk and crises 
management and critical security studies. The basic category of these theories is the 
understanding, preventing and tackling the consequences of risks. A risk according to 
ISO 31000 (standards of risk management formulated by International Organization of 
Standardization) is a ‘basic negative and positive effects of uncertainty on objectives’ 
(IOS; 2017).  In majority of studies of cyber security the category of a risk is used 
interchangeably with a term threat and can be defined as ‘possibility of malicious 
activities in which a digital system or network is exposed to a cyber attack or crime 
enabling the attackers to get unauthorized access to systems and data’ (Center of cyber 
security, 2017). The main risks in cyber space of a country include cyber crimes, cyber 
attacks, cyber terrorism and cyber espionage.  All of the threats are or may be present in a 
country to different extent depending on the level of its digitization, development and use 
of Information and communication technologies (ICT) both on a state level and among 
general public. Such threats are becoming more dangerous if country is a war, especially 
if the enemy is technologically well developed (Geers, 2017). 
 
a) Cyber crime  
 
‘The 2010 Resolution of the United Nations on cyber security defines cyber crimes as 
first main challenges to country’s security in cyber space’ (Ayofe, 2009 16). It is 
important to differentiate cyber crimes from computer based crimes which are often 
perceived as a broader term involving crimes which do not include a network intrusion. 
Cybercrime is a narrow term which is understood as an ‘illegal behavior directed by 
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means of electronic operations that target the security of computer systems and the data 
processed by them’ (Ayofe, 2009: 16).  
The first cyber crimes took place right after the emerge of Information and 
communication technologies and first uses of them. However, the first cyber crimes were 
less sophisticated and could rather fit the concept of computer-based crimes rather than 
cyber crimes as mentioned above. The first cybercrime of such type was recorded in 
Canada in 1969. It was an attempt of a student to burn a computer in order to steal data. 
In 1970
th
 computer based crimes became quite spread in the United States which led to 
the first attempts to adopt a bill on cybercrime prevention in this country. The speed of 
technology and internet development and its spread increased the level of sophistication 
of cyber crimes and therefore there was a necessity to adopt a new international 
agreement which would introduce regulations and common standards when addressing 
cyber crimes. Thus, the Budapest Convention on cybercrime was approved in 2001 and 
with few amendments later on still remains the main international bill on understanding, 
preventing and tackling cyber crimes. Cyber crimes are often conducted outside the 
victim country since the crime in a computer network can be conducted from any 
territory and the further that territory is (not only geographically but also legally) the 
easier it will be for a cybercriminal not to be caught. This makes cyber crimes 
specifically complicated and requires active involvement of all countries in catching 
cyber criminals. 
b) Cyber terrorism, cyber attacks and cyber sabotage 
 
Cyber attacks, cyber terrorism and cyber sabotage are differentiated from cyber crimes 
because of the goals these two threats pursue. The means which are used to conduct both 
cyber crimes and cyber attacks are the same, however the aim of cyber criminals is 
usually to get economic or some other personal gains while the aims of cyber terrorists 
are often political. There is no agreement or common understanding in academia 
regarding the term cyberterrorism and cyber sabotage, however everyone agrees that 
cyberterrorism takes place if there is a motive of causing fear in the society. The term 
itself was coined by Barry Collin, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and 
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Intelligence in California in 1997. He explained the term as the use of terrorism in a new 
space – cyberspace (Abomhara, 2015). In 2008 the definition of cyberterrorism was given 
by NATO which is understood there as “a cyber-attack using or exploiting computer or 
communication networks to cause sufficient destruction to generate fear or intimidate a 
society into an ideological goal” (Kurnava, 2016). Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) of the United States defines cyber terrorism as ‘“a criminal act perpetrated 
through computers resulting in violence, death and/or destruction, and creating terror for 
the purpose of coercing a government to change its policies” (Kurnava, 2016).  
 
As for cyber attacks, there are two types of them– the ones focused at attacking data and 
the ones focus at attacking control systems. The first type of cyber attacks is most widely 
spread and is more related to the concept of cyber espionage when the second one is more 
dangerous and can lead to the malfunction of factories, state infrastructure, services. 
(Abomhara, 2015). Potential targets which cyber terrorist are aiming at in this context are 
nation’s critical infrastructure and e-government platforms that significantly depend on 
internet and communication technologies. The more the country is dependent on 
computer systems and technologies the bigger are the risks of cyber attacks (Abomhara, 
2015). The ways the cyber attacks on a country are conducted are ‘systems manipulation 
through secret entrance software, data deletion, Web sites damaging, viruses inserting’ 
such Stuxnet, Blackenergy, Sandworm and others (Bogdanowski, 2013). Both cyber 
attacks against state websites and e-government platforms and critical infrastructure are 
dangerous depending on the significance of the object attacked. For example, a country 
which has a very well development e-government platforms which citizens are using in 
their everyday life in order to get some basic services from a state such as medical care, 
administrative certificates, allowances etc. in the event of a cyber attack can suffer 
significantly and thus prove its inability to provide basic services to citizens (Theohary, 
2015). At the same time, an attack against a government web site which just contains 
information about some services and will not be as dangerous as in the first case. The 
termination of its work will entail negative image consequences for a country. Same logic 
applies to attacks against critical infrastructure which are usually referred to as cyber 
sabotage. Consequences of an attack against a nuclear power station will be way worse 
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than an attack against an electric grid the aim of which is to leave citizens without 
electricity for some period and trigger a panic (Bogdanowski, 2013). 
  
Thus, cyber terrorism is dangerous because of the relative ease to conduct a cyber attack 
of a large scale. Conducting cyber attacks does not require many human resources and 
capitals (Bognanowski, 2013). As with cyber crimes, cyber terrorists can act being 
physically very far from their target and hard to be tracked. Yet, experts believe that the 
most damaging cyber attacks are those which combine a cyber attack with a physical 
terrorist attack. 
 
c) Cyberespionage  
 
Cyberespionage can be defined as ‘the strategy of breaking into computer systems and 
networks in order to extract sensitive governmental or corporate information’ (Morag, 
2014:12). Cyber espionage is also referred to as cyber spying by come authors. 
Cyberespionage is a very wide spread threat which may have or not have a political aim 
and therefore be considered as a part of cyber crime concept or cyber terrorism 
respectively and be dealt with on a different level of state security and defense bodies. 
Cyber espionage is usually conducted by the use of zero days exploits together with spear 
phishing and watering hole attacks in order to infiltrate the networks and get sensitive 
data (Morag, 2014).  ‘Gathered data can also be used for lateral movements within 
targeted systems in order to get information from other sources though the one the 
criminals managed to penetrate’ (Paganini, 2015). In this context, it is of crucial 
importance for all actors to cooperate in preventing and countering cyberespionage. 
Government bodies can contain sensitive information about private companies and vise-
versa therefore the good level of cyber protection is needed on both sides (Morag,2014). 
 
d) Cyber and hybrid warfare 
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A range of cyber attacks targeted at one country by other countries or non-state actors can 
be called a cyber warfare which is the part of a broader concept of a hybrid warfare 
(Pernik, 2015). Both terms are quite ambiguous and do not have one generally accepted 
definition. As in the case of cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage and cyber 
sabotage there is no international agreement or treaty which would shed light on common 
understanding of these terms as it was with the Budapest agreement on cyber crimes. 
Some scholars tend to call a cyber warfare only in the case that state actors are engaged 
in offensive and defensive efforts using cyber weapons (Hoffman, 2015; Conca, 2014). 
Others which are the majority consider cyber attacks conducted by non-state actors 
against country’s critical infrastructure as an act of cyber warfare (Pernik, 2015; Geers; 
2017; Malchenyuk 2017). Cyber warfare can be defined then as a ‘cyber capacity of a 
sufficient scale, during a determined period in high speed, to reach certain objectives in 
or through cyberspace, these actions being considered as a menace for the targeted state.’ 
(Belgium, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, there is a common agreement among researches that cyber warfare is a part 
of a broader concept of hybrid war. Firstly, the concept of hybrid warfare was used by 
William J. Nemeth with regards to the war in Chechnya in 2002 (Nemeth, 2002). It 
became frequently used also as of 2005 when looking at the strategy of Hezbollah during 
Lebanon war. After that, the concept became incorporated into political science to 
describe future and modern means of warfare including both conventional and 
unconventional weapons (Puyvelde, 2016). Hybrid warfare is used to combat Western 
predominance in conventional weapons by turning to ‘conventional/unconventional, 
regular/irregular, overt/covert means’ (Puyvelde, 2016). However, a number of scholars 
argue that hybrid warfare itself have not brought anything new in understanding of war. 
Asymmetries have always been used to target weaknesses of an enemy using 
conventional/unconventional, regular/irregular, overt/covert means (Bachman, 2014; 
Neag 2015). Therefore, the emergence of cyber warfare and other modern means of war 
which are often immediately included in the concept of hybrid war has not changed war`s 
nature but added another element of warfare along with air, space, sea and land 
(Hoffman, 2007). For the purpose of this thesis, hybrid warfare is then defined as 
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sophisticated campaigns that combine low-level conventional and special operations; 
offensive cyber and space actions; and psychological operations that use social and 
traditional media to influence popular perception and international opinion (Hoffman, 
2015). 
 
e) Conclusion 
 
Thus, having defined and explained main cyber threats to national’s cyber security and 
resilience as well as the notions of cyber and hybrid warfare this dissertation will look at 
national’s policy in cyber security and resilience of Ukraine from the position of 
preventing and tackling these threats according to their nature and peculiarities. Cyber 
crimes are differentiated from the cyber attacks by the goals which these two threats 
pursue. Cyber attacks and cyber sabotage constitute a broader notion of cyber terrorism 
which is aimed at causing fear and chaos in the society. Cyber espionage is conducted for 
the purpose of collecting classified information from government and people. All of these 
threats if conducted repetitiously against one target usually a country may be called a 
cyber warfare. Cyber warfare can also be considered as one of the means of a broader 
concept of hybrid warfare if used for the purpose of influencing people’s perceptions and 
international opinions.  
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3. Cyber security and cyber resilience. The conceptualization of cyber 
resilience 
 
Achieving security in a cyber sphere has been viewed for a long time as an adequate and 
realistic goal. However, rapid development of IT has been accompanied with new 
challenges in cyber security. This lead to shift in ways of providing cyber security. Cyber 
security has no longer been sufficient and ‘provided required protection’ (Durbin, 2016). 
Thus, the need to develop a new approach was articulated first in IT sphere, then in 
business and on a state level. While resilience as an approach to tackle risks existed in 
political science for a while (Handmer and Dovers, 1996; Adey and Anderson, 2012; 
Anderson, 2010; Anderson and Adey, 2011; Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Rasmussen, 
2007) it has not been researched and explained enough regarding cyber space on a state 
level. For the purpose of this research, cyberspace is defined as ‘…the interdependent 
network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers in critical industries’ (Rasmussen, 2007:15). 
 
a) Cyber security related concepts 
Such terms as cyber security, information security, information and communications 
security, computer security, internet security and cyber resilience in cyberspace are often 
used interchangeably not only in media but also by government, experts and researchers. 
It is important to draw the difference between those concepts even though there are 
ongoing debates in academia on their meaning.  ICT security is a broader or umbrella 
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term which is used to indicate both software and hardware security however it does not 
relate to security of data in the web (Techtarget, 2009). Information security is used with 
regards to security of all data either online or printed.  Computer security refers to 
hardware and computers security (Relia, 2016). Internet security has different meaning 
from technical and political point of views. In IT sphere internet security is usually 
understood as ‘protecting internet-related services and related ICT systems and networks 
as an extension of network security in organizations and at home, to achieve the purpose 
of security. Internet security also ensures the availability and reliability of internet 
services.’ (Relia, 2016:231). However, in political science this concept is more related to 
internet safety, legal use of data, intellectual rights and issues related to censorship on the 
web (Hathaway; Klimburg, 2015). If we speak about the military side of cyber space, the 
events of cyber attacks or espionage the term cyber defence is used. Cyber defense 
according to NATO definition is ‘the ability to safeguard the delivery and management of 
services in an operational CIS in response to potential and imminent as well as actual 
malicious actions that originate in cyberspace’ (NATO website, 2017: 8). 
 
b) Cyber security concept 
Cyber security as a concept became widely used after the year 2000 and the issue with 
the so-called millennium software bug. Majority of researchers agree that cyber security 
encompasses all the above mentioned terms and is an umbrella term that indicates ‘the 
collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk 
management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that 
can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets.’ (ITU, 
2017;13) However, each country defines cyber security with regards to its peculiarities 
and needs. Thus, ‘cyber security in Germany is the desired IT state in which the risks the 
country faces from cyber space are reduced to an acceptable and manageable level’ 
(Federal Ministry of Interior of Germany, 2011). 
Theoretically, there were few attempts to look at cyber security from a political science 
perspective. Cyber security tends to rely on either traditional theories of International 
Relations (realism, constructivism, liberalism) and, more precisely, the concept of cyber 
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power (Kramer et al. 2010; Nye, Jr 2010; Klimburg 2011a; Betz and Stevens 2011; 
Sliwinski 20141), or critical security studies which encompass securitization (Eriksson 
2001; Bendrath et al. 2007; Dunn Cavelty 2007, 2008). However, there are also few 
researchers who look at cyber security though regulatory or governance approaches 
(Brown and Marsden 2007; Mueller 2010). Even though knowledge of all these 
approaches are useful for understanding cyber security this research will look at cyber 
security through the prism of cyber power since this approach is the most developed one. 
Thus, most authors look at cyber security from the cyber power perspective which 
according J. Nye is ‘the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence 
events in other operational environments and across the instruments of power’ (Nye, 
2010: 4). 
 
However, the authors who look at cyber security through the concept of cyber power 
differently see the role of non-state actors in its exerting. Thus, Nye believes that 
‘governments remain the strongest actors in resource terms, even though networks 
become more important as a tool of governance’ (Christou, 2016). Another group of 
researchers including Betz and Stevens (2011) underline the ‘the variety of powers that 
circulate in cyberspace and which shape the experiences of those who act in and through 
cyberspace’ (Betz and Stevens 2011, p.44). In line with cyber power concept Klimburg 
defines the following components as underlying to achieve cyber security: efficient 
coordination, cooperation and cohesion among governmental bodies; work with 
international organizations and adhering to common policies on cyber security; 
involvement of NGOs, civil society, businesses and other stakeholders to the process of 
achieving cyber security. However, Klimburg in his policy paper for the European 
Parliament argues that ‘the most important dimension of cyber power is the ability to 
motivate and attract one’s own citizens, an inward-focused soft-power approach that is 
fundamental for creating a “whole of nation” cyber capability’ (2011, p.43). He claims 
that in order to achieve resilience (which he does not define) a government (in the paper - 
‘EU’) has to involve civil society and volunteers and build efficient public-private 
partnerships and informal cooperation. 
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Nevertheless, while cyber power approach to cyber security stress on the necessity of 
efficient coordination and communication between actors, it does not do not explain how 
such partnerships should be built. Same applies to risk assessment which is believed to be 
important step in projecting cyber power but is not given enough attention to within 
beforementioned researches on cyber power and cyber security. Stuart Starr in this 
context argues that understanding of risks and threats is very little ‘to employ neither in 
cyber assessments nor the relationships among those measures’ (Starr, 2009). 
Furthermore, cyber security is rather focused on achieving overall protection in the cyber 
sphere rather than accepting the need to adapt to constantly changing environment of 
cyber space and very high probability of success of a cyber attack.  And this is where the 
concept of resilience steps in to offer solutions. 
 
c) Resilience concept  
 
Resilience is a notion borrowed from material sciences and describes the ‘ability of a 
material to recover its shape after a deformation’ (Dahlman, 2011:40). Stephen Cauffman 
defines resilience as ‘the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and 
withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions’ (Caufmann, 2016:3). Resilience includes 
the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally 
occurring threats or incidents. Within various policy fields, resilience is discussed as the 
answer to a ‘world of rapid change, complexity and unexpected events’ (Chandler, 
2013a: 1).  
Concept of resilience has been recently introduced into the political science by 
connecting this concept with global governance (Pfister and Suter, 1987), by explaining 
the role of NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Barany and Rauchhaus 2011) 
and by introducing new approaches in international development and humanitarian 
spheres using some ideas borrowed from risk management theories (Goldstein 2011; 
Sendzimir, Reij, and Magnuszewski, 2011; Davies, 2012; Muggah and Savage, 2012). 
The concept of resilience is quite debatable among scholars and there is no single 
definition agreed by everyone. Majority of political science scholars who are applying 
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resilience concept believe that resilience is ‘the process of patterned adjustments adopted 
by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks’ (Bourbeau, 
2015:375).  Resilience looks at society as a system which exists in the constantly 
changing and unpredictable environment (Holling, 1973). However, on the contrary to 
risk analysis and traditional crisis management strategies resilience is aimed at 
‘preventing and preparing for a potentially disruptive future and is characterized by a 
temporality that combines the present with the future, but also actively deals with 
insecurities of the past’ (Cavelty, Kristensen, Kaufmann, 2015). Resilience concept found 
its profound coverage within the critical security scholarship over the past few years. 
Majority of critical literature on resilience stems from Anglo-Saxon academia and 
empirical researches of Joseph, 2013; Chandler, 2012, 2013b; Duffield, 2012; Rogers, 
2013b; Williams, 2013; (Handmer and Dovers, 1996; Adey and Anderson, 2012; 
Anderson, 2010; Anderson and Adey, 2011; Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Petersen, 
2012; Rasmussen, 2007. In theory, critical scholarship on resilience looks at where 
resilience is placed within liberal security scholarship and what it brings to it. (Chandler, 
2012, 2014; Duffield, 2012; Evans and Reid, 2013; Lentzos and Rose, 2009; O’Malley, 
2010; Walker and Cooper, 2011; Zebrowski, 2013) 
 
There were few attempts to categorize resilience by different scholars in order to 
systematize the understanding of it. Thus, Rogers (2013) suggests looking at three 
categorize of resilience – organizational, community and technological depending on 
where resilience takes place. Walkate (2013) at the same time identifies resilience within 
different society levels: human level, family, institutions, religions, nations and global 
level. Bourbeau (2013) uses different approach and suggests looking at categorizes of 
resilience from political perspective which appears as a result of a choice of political 
actors rather than exists as a ‘self-emergent autopoietic processes of (complex) systems’ 
(Handmer and Dovers, 1996). Resilience is studied by looking at two main topics – 
temporalities and subjects. As for temporalities resilience is seen as a preparedness to the 
event in the future which thus defines the present (O’Malley, 2010: 488).  However, it 
also looks at past experiences which are useful to prepare for possible future threats 
(Evans and Reid, 2013: 91). 
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Subjects of resilience are mostly explained through a neo-liberal doctrine where they are 
claimed to a result of active self-organization in the events of crisis. However, resilient 
subjects may also be government backed but in fewer cases (Bulley, 2013; Rogers, 
2013a). Resilience is aimed to change focuses and responsibilities for security. Resilient 
subjects exist due to the shift from ‘government to municipalities, from national to local, 
from security authorities to the citizen – expecting and encouraging beneficial self-
organization in the face of crisis by those units that are both knowledgeable of local 
contexts and directly affected by the adverse event’ (Hagmann and Dunn Cavelty, 2012). 
Civil society which is self-organized plays a crucial role in achieving resilience and acts 
as a central subject of this concept. The role of private sector and cooperation with a state 
in the form of public-private partnerships is also emphasized. Public-private partnerhip is 
"a long-term contract between a private party and a government entity, for providing a 
public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risk and management 
responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance" (World Bank, 2017).  
 
Resilience can also be seen as ‘as a precursor to security—that is, as a process leading to 
and inducing security (Bourbeau, 2015:383). However, in case of applying ‘security does 
not refer to the absence of danger but rather the ability of a system...to reorganise to 
rebound from a potentially catastrophic event.’ (Cavelty, 2013: 23). Resilience approach 
is focused more on solutions rather than problems implying more defense spending 
(Jegen, Merand, 2014). In the field of crisis management and emergency response 
international organizations together with the United Nations, have introduced resilience 
as a ‘new organizing principle, the development of which is perceived as critical to 
preventing unacceptable levels of human suffering and reducing the costs of international 
emergency response’ (Bourbeau, 2015:377). The definition provided by the UN thus 
portrays resilience as a solution to reduce costs by involving all stakeholders to 
preventing and reducing the negative consequences of crises.  
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d) Cyber resilience 
Cyber resilience in its turn is was introduced as an answer to ‘increasingly inadequate 
response to the modern cyber threat landscape’ provided by the concept of cyber security 
(IT Governance, 2017). Cyber security according to IT scholarship claimed that computer 
system can be protected from any potential cyber risk. Cyber resilience on the contrary 
accepts that a ‘cyber attack will inevitably succeed’ (IT Governance, 2017). Cyber 
resilience thus is about identification and responding to cyber attack in order to achieve 
the survival of a computer system.  Cyber resilience concept was built on the merge of 
traditional cyber security approach and business resilience. It consists of two main 
components: 
• Ensuring cyber security without reducing some capabilities of computer systems. 
• Having a business plan which would stipulate the way to secure critical 
information in case the cyber attack is successful.  
 
Cyber resilience also stresses on changing the general perception of security in IT. It 
focuses on changing the culture and behavior when dealing with computer systems. Apart 
from setting a business plan and improving organizational leadership it talks about 
working with all employees who deal with computer systems. ‘Investment in research, 
education, and identification of best practices needs to underpin this cultural aspect in the 
long-term’ (Nicholas, 2016:23).  Cyber resilience from the point of view of IT sphere 
thus can be defined as the ‘preparations that an organization has made with regard to 
threats and vulnerabilities, the defences that have been developed, and the resources 
available for mitigating a security failure after it happens’ (World Economic Forum 
papers, 2012). 
 
Cyber resilience concept in political science was applied by George Christou in 2016 
towards EU activities in cyber dimension. He fused the concepts of cyber governance and 
resilience in order to look at cyber security as resilience. By doing so he looked at 
resilience as proactive rather than reactive by ‘accepting not resisting the inevitability of 
change and the creation of a system that is capable of adapting to new conditions and 
imperatives’ (Christou,2016). At the same time traditional security governance approach 
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does not focus much attention on the complexity of meta-governance (Cavelty,2008) and 
relations between private and public sector. Therefore, the success of the cyber security 
as resilience concept lies in ‘coalitions of different actors working together in partnership 
to construct new flexible and adaptive institutions and operating procedures, set the 
agenda and implement policies’ (Christou, 2016). Such coalition should be supplemented 
by the decent level of IT education of citizens. Investment in research, education, and 
identification of best practices needs to underpin the ‘cultural aspect’ of cyber resilience 
in the long-term (Nicholas, 2016). 
 
Among actors which have to be involved in providing cyber security are civil society 
which is a key element in building resilient communities and businesses. Private sector as 
mentioned can cooperate with a state on a basis of private-public partnership models. 
Usually critical infrastructure is owned at least by 50% by private companies which 
provide tools such as antiviruses, IT security trainings to ensure security of cyber 
component of their enterprise. However, if an attack takes or may take place and its 
source is hard to find a country has means ‘collect foreign intelligence, collaborate with 
other international agencies, and gain access to critical information regarding potential 
threats’ (Jagasia, 2017:2). There are many models upon which a business and a state can 
form a partnership and its selection depends on many factors ranging from interest of 
parties to cooperate, level of trust, available resources etc. One of the examples of 
efficient private-public partnership in cyber security was established in Netherlands 
between local businesses and a state. Both institutions responsible for decision making on 
national cyber security within a state – Cyber Security Panel and Government Regulatory 
Body are formed on the basis of private-public partnerships (picture 1) to increase trust 
between all partners, discuss mutual interests and prospects of cooperation. 
 
In strategic view, cyber resilience can be understood as an element of ‘deterrence by 
denial, or persuading the enemy not to attack by convincing him that his attack will be 
defeated – that is, that he will not be able to achieve his operational objectives.’ Thus, in 
events of hybrid warfare and its component cyber warfare resilience is aimed to prepare 
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the nation to the extent that the attack will not make sense to be placed (Pernik, 2015). 
For this purpose the following goals are to be achieved:  
 
1. Good societal competencies in understanding the nature of cyber warfare tools 
and ways to oppose them (Cavelty, 2015) 
2. High level of trust between civil society and government provided through 
efficient government communication, political leadership and integrity of political system 
(Pernik, 2015; Rhinaud, Sundelius, 2014). 
3. Strong sense of community between different groups of citizens, availability of 
local opportunities for citizens aimed at their empowerment, equity in economy that helps 
to reduce possible tensions between different groups in society and a state (Pernik, 2015; 
Rhinaud, Sundelius, 2014). 
4. High level of development of volunteering culture in the country specifically with 
regard to security and defense; existence of grass root security organizations and 
initiatives aimed at strengthening national security (Pernik, 2015; Rhinaud, Sundelius, 
2014). 
5. High economic development as well as economic diversification and 
preparedness to reduce the possible damages of a cyber attack targeted at state`s 
economic activities. 
6. Ability of critical infrastructure, as well as ICT systems to reduce the impact of 
cyber attacks, espionage or sabotage, adapt and continue working in the normal regime. 
(Rhinaud; Sundelius, 2014). 
7. Efficient coordination of all actors involved in providing cyber resilience. ‘A high 
degree of cooperation capacity translates into fewer transactions costs that impede both 
shared sense-making and collective action-taking’ (Rhinaud; Sundelius, 2014).  
8. Necessary amount of reserves such as financial resources, technical equipment 
and software which would allow to quickly renew damaged objects and avoid a 
possibility of an attack to have a broad negative impact on ‘the nation’s will to persevere’ 
(Yost, 2003). 
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e) Cyber resilience criteria 
 
Thus, having analyzed the approaches to resilience from different perspectives the 
following criteria are identified as necessary to achieve cyber resilience at the national 
level:  
 
1. Efficient coordination and cooperation of all actors involved in providing cyber 
security of the country.  
Special role in this regard is played by state agencies and bodies, their transparency and 
readiness to share critical information with all stakeholders including foreign partners and 
due to often international nature of cyber attacks. Coordination is also needed to avoid 
duplication of a high number of actors involved in achieving cyber security. Leadership 
and high level of trust is required to act fast on both strategic and operational level in the 
event of a potential cyber attack or in case a cyber attack occurred to quickly regroup and 
reduce shortcomings (Yost, 2003). 
2. Private-public partnerships between businesses and government.  
Business can provide not only resources and tools regarding national cyber resilience but 
also unique expertise which by being formed in the business and competitive 
environment is considered to be more ‘proactive and risk-managing oriented. Private-
public partnerships may be established under different conditions in accordance with the 
agreement between a state and business.  
 
3. Social capital built on strong communities and volunteers are crucial for 
achieving resilience in any sphere including cyber. 
The resilience approach moves ‘from government to municipalities, from national to 
local, from security authorities to the citizen – expecting and encouraging beneficial self-
organization in the face of crisis by those units that are both knowledgeable of local 
contexts and directly affected by the adverse event’ (Hagmann and Dunn Cavelty, 2012). 
Robert Deibert maned civil society as an “increasingly recognised and important 
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stakeholder in cyberspace governance” (Deibert, 2011). Grass root organizations and 
initiatives are able to respond quickly to potential or actual threats. High level of trust 
between governmental bodies and agencies and communities are crucial for the efficient 
work of such communities (Pernik, 2014).  
 
4. Good level of IT and cyber security education provided at school, Universities, 
educational institutions as well as general cyber security awareness at public and private 
organizations focusing on new threats and rapid growth of ICT should be provided at all 
levels.  
 
Experts agree that the majority of cyber crimes, breaches and attacks are caused by 
ordinary people who are not aware of simple ‘cyber hygiene’ (Pescatore; 2002). Since 
hackers and intruders are very well aware of this people’s vulnerability they often take 
advantage of it and plan the attacks accordingly (Payne; 2003). 
 
f) Conclusion 
 
Therefore, different concepts regarding security of ICT and computers were identified 
and compared. Focusing most at the theoretical framework of cyber security, resilience 
and cyber resilience and their interplay for the purpose of this research cyber security was 
analyzed through the cyber power approach developed by Nye (2010) and Klimburg 
(2009) While cyber security focuses on achieving overall protection in the cyber sphere 
rather than accepting the need to adapt to constantly changing environment of cyber 
space and does not equally recognize the growing role of non-state actors cyber resilience 
provides a new approach to national cyber security policies. Even though scholars looked 
at resilience from different perspectives within the theory of good governance or 
humanitarian response in political studies all of them agree that resilience’s added value 
lies in explaining the advantages of active self-organization in the events of crisis and 
ways to reorganize to rebound from a potentially catastrophic event as well as shift from 
responsibilities for security to different stakeholders (NGOs, businesses). These 
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resilience’s features are applied also towards cyber space where the level of 
unpredictability and constant change is very high. Cyber resilience, thus looks at such 
criteria as efficient coordination and cooperation of all actors and stakeholders, civil 
society, private-public partnerships and IT security awareness which are necessary to 
efficiently respond to the changing nature of cyber threats. Particularly these four criteria 
are defined above will be used to test Ukrainian policy on cyber security on its 
correspondence to the emerging concept of resilience. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Cyber security and cyber resilience on the national level  
 
Having looked at cyber security and cyber resilience concepts, it is important to define 
how they are implemented on the policy level of the state. There are many approaches to 
understanding policy specifically public policy but for the purpose of this research, public 
policy is seen as a set of ‘governmental decisions and the result of activities which the 
government undertakes in pursuance of certain goals and objectives’ (Torjman, 2005:3). 
The main aim of the public policy is to provide solutions to existing and possible issues 
related to the public (Torjman, 2005). 
a) National security 
There are many spheres in which the government applies public policy, one of which is 
national security. Understanding of national security differs according to each countries’ 
priorities and needs. Furthermore, the concept is complex since it has to respond to 
threats which constantly evolve and change over time. While security as a concept 
concerns among others human or individual rights to stay safe and protected from threats 
national security concept encompasses those aspects of security for which a state can take 
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responsibility for. Therefore, national security is a political construct which looks at the 
spheres of security where the state is or may be involved. These spheres are economy, 
social and political life and among others cyber space. National security in cyber space is 
called National Cyber Security and is defined as ‘the focused application of specific 
governmental levers and information assurance principles to public, private and relevant 
international ICT systems, and their associated content, where these systems directly 
pertain to national security’ (Klimburg, 2016:29). 
b) National Cyber Security policy 
National Cyber Security policies are formed using different approaches according to a 
country’s priorities. Some countries are more prone to cyber threats due to high level of 
development of ICT technologies (for example USA, Great Britain, Germany, Estonia). 
There are also countries which do not consider as necessary to have an integrated Cyber 
security policy. Provisions related to cyber security are incorporated into broader 
National Security doctrines though majority of countries have cyber component related to 
defence forces (Argentina, Philippines, majority of African countries) (Subrahmanian, 
Ovelgonne, Tudor, 2015). In general, introducing of Cyber Security policies is a 
relatively recent phenomenon which apart from USA became the most evident for 
majority of countries only in the 21 century.  Around one hundred countries in the world 
own cyber capabilities and only fifty of them adopted specific policies usually in the 
forms of a strategy on cyber security. Cyber security strategy is thus a “the development 
and employment of capabilities to operate in cyberspace, integrated and coordinated with 
the other operational domains, to achieve or support the achievement of objectives across 
the elements of national power’ (US National Military Strategy, 2004). The main aim of a 
cyber security strategy according to ENISA (European network and information security 
agency) is ‘to increase the global resilience and security of national ICT assets, which 
support critical functions of the state or of the society as a whole.’ (ENISA guide, 2012). 
This goal can be broken down into few concrete objectives which are tackling cyber 
crimes, raising awareness about cyber risks, securing government online systems, 
adopting efficient legislation on cyber security, strengthening infrastructure, supporting 
civil society initiatives in cyber security, clarifying foreign policy in cyber security. All 
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these efforts should contribute to the economic prosperity and increase of cyber resilience 
of the country. 
NCS policies should have at least three functions:  
 Provide a vision for government agencies and bodies on cyber security priorities 
in order for them to develop coherent policies. 
 Facilitate the adoption of sub-strategies in other spheres that cyber security 
provisions are incorporated. 
 Define spheres where resources are needed to achieve cyber security and 
resilience (Klimburg,2016:46). 
Stakeholders of the NCS policy are government citizens, owners of critical infrastructure 
and businesses prone to cyber threats, government systems. However, depending on a 
country and its NCS policy stakeholders are defined differently with using different 
approaches to address them. Thus, ‘historical, cultural, legal, organizational and political 
structure of a nation can lead to significant differences in working with stakeholders, 
ranging from a cooperative approach, public-private partnership, to mandatory legislation 
and regulation’ (NATO Manual, 2016; 35). 
Cyber security policy should define three main levels at which cyber security efforts are 
to be undertaken as well as their system and relation with each other – governmental, 
non-governmental and international (Klimburg,2016) It is important that NSC documents 
do not exist independently from other national security doctrines and are connected with 
them. As for the structure of a National Cyber Security policy there are three dimensions 
which are to be identified as mentioned above. On the governmental level, usually a large 
number of state agencies and bodies are involved in providing cyber security including 
ministries of defense, telecommunications, police, infrastructure, commerce. This is 
unavoidable due to the scope and depth of the issues related to cyber security. What is 
important here is to make sure that the coordination, communications and trust between 
all these bodies and agencies is ensured on the highest level. This one of the major 
challenge which National Cyber Security policies face which can be solved by a range of 
various approaches such as appointing an organ responsible for coordination of state 
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efforts in cyber security and resilience or/and improving the channels of communication 
between different bodies and agencies. 
Another important dimension of every NCS policy is the inclusion of an effective 
mechanism which would facilitate the cooperation of the state and non-governmental 
actors in providing cyber resilience. Due to the rapid growth of a number of non-
governmental actors in cyber sphere it is specifically important to give them voice and 
make sure that they are able to realize their potential. Some look at the third national 
dimension of NCS policies as at cooperation between state and private companies which 
own critical infrastructure. However, while such cooperation is crucial, the equal 
attention should be given to civil society capacities and small and medium business 
capabilities. According to the comprehensive approach to security or the whole nation 
approach a ‘wide range of non-state actors (in particular private companies but also 
NGOs) should cooperate with the government on cyber security issues.’ (CCDCE 
manual, 2016). Such cooperation can be ensured by applying different methods – through 
consultation meetings and easing legislation regarding the work of NGOs and small and 
medium businesses in cyber security sphere to the support of security of such enterprises 
and exchange of critical information.  
Having defined the objectives, stakeholders and approaches to work with them as well 
the structure of NCS policies it is also important to focus on strategy development 
process. Thus, there are three approaches a country can take when developing a NCS 
policy – bottom-up, top-down and re-iterative approaches. The selection of the approach 
depends of the role which every category of stakeholders plays in implementing NCS 
policy. Some countries such as the United Kingdom and France have applied pure top-
down approach taking control over developing of legislation, policies and strategic 
documents which form a NCS strategy. The advantage of such approach is ‘an increased 
focus on the document and the development of policies is far more streamlined’, however 
civil society and businesses may not agree on some provisions and negatively respond to 
the government (Klimburg, Healey, 2016:90). 
In order to avoid criticism from the part of civil society and businesses some countries 
apply a mixed approach combining bottom-up and top-down features which is called re-
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iterative approach. In 2003 when the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace started to be 
developed US government used a bottom down approach by inviting experts, cyber 
security companies and other businesses in consultation meetings which ensured an 
overall acceptance of the strategy by citizens and businesses. However, in 5 years when 
cyber security threats became more dangerous to state system US government adopted 
another strategy – the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative this time behind 
closed doors. Even though this document included some provisions elaborated within the 
first strategy its main part was worked out by the government and was made classified. 
Some other countries such as Germany and Netherlands applied a pure bottom-up 
approach involving civil society and business in defining NCS agenda. It is also 
important to stress that bottom-up approach does not concern only the involvement of big 
private companies concerned with cyber security issues. It is main idea lies in involving 
all stakeholders in the process of NCS strategy development. For example, when 
developing its NCS strategy Netherlands established the Dutch National Cyber Security 
Council which serves as top level advisory organ on cyber security in the country. Eight 
out of 14 members of the Council are representatives of private sector and NGOs. The 
co-chair of the Council is also always a non-state actor. 
c) Conclusion 
 
Thus, cyber security and cyber resilience is addressed within National cyber security 
policies of each country. NSC policies are a part of a broader concept of national security 
of each country which are designed to tackle challenges which exist in cyberspace. NCS 
policies are to serve as guidelines for a country on how to approach cyber risks and 
provide cyber security by addressing the needs and capabilities of all stakeholders in 
cyber sphere. It was proved that NSC policies should address three fundamental levels – 
governmental, non-governmental and international. Forms, objectives and content of all 
NCS policies differ according to the priorities and needs of every country. Three main 
approaches to developing a NSC policy were also identified: bottom-up, top-down and 
re-iterative ones depending on how much different stakeholders of cyber security are 
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involved in NSC policy. Some governments involve non-state actors into the process of 
development of NCS policies, others keep large of their parts classified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ukrainian case study 
 
5. Overview of Ukrainian policy on cyber security. History and current 
state 
 
a) Summary of cyber attacks in Ukraine 
 
Ukraine has been a target of a large number of cyber attacks and cyber crimes throughout 
its history. The first cyber attack which took place in Ukraine was targeted against 
Ukrainian banking system and its state bank ‘Ukraine’ (Buryachok; 2016). An attack 
took place in 1995 and ended with the loss of 4 million of dollars from the state bank. 
The next biggest cyber attack took place in 2007 and was targeted at government 
websites. It was a massive DDos attack which lasted for 3 days but received very little 
reaction from government. DDos attacks is ‘an attempt to make an online service 
unavailable by overwhelming it with traffic from multiple sources’ (Gu, 2007). In a 
statement late made by the state security service, it was mentioned that cyber attacks 
against government web sites were taking place quite often all around the world and there 
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are limited ways of resisting them (Buryachok, 2016).  Other ‘big’ cyber attacks and 
cyber crimes, which were taking place before 2014 and should be mentioned are: 
 1997 – an attack against Global Ukraine internet provider which stopped its work 
for few hours 
 2000 – an attack against one of the biggest internet providers Ukr.net 
 2012 – a series of DDos attacks targeted at a state IP in the course of 
parliamentary elections 
Most cyber attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and state websites took place 
in 2015-2016, one year after the war with Russia started. Data on the biggest cyber 
attacks are provided in table 1. According to the statement made by Defence Minister of 
Ukraine Mr. Poltorak, ‘there were at least 7000 cyber attacks against Ukrainian critical 
infrastructure and government websites since the war with Russia started in 2014’ 
(Poltorak, 2017).  Furthermore, according to Kaspersky Security Network statistics, 
Ukraine is the 9
th
 country in the world according to the number of cyber attacks and 
crimes taking place. Around 33,7% of Ukrainians faced cyber threats for the last 3 years. 
(Kaspersky security network, 2017).   
b) Development of legislation in cyber security 
Even though Ukraine has been a target of large cyber attacks throughout its history, there 
has been a lack of specific policy regarding the prevention and tackling of cyber attacks. 
Until 2014 cyber security issues were scarcely discussed on the governmental level. 
There were no laws and regulations which concern cyber attacks or cyber crimes. Issues 
related to security of cyber space were looked through the concepts of information and 
computer security. The concept of cyber security however, was incorporated in the 
doctrine of information security and was mentioned only as a part of this broader 
concept. Such approach was taken since in Ukrainian academic tradition the term cyber is 
used with regard to technical issues. The term information security in its turn has a 
broader scope and used to incorporate some issues regarding cyber security.   
Thus, according to Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which was adopted on 28 
June 1996, ‘protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, its economic 
and information security is one of the main functions of the state and all Ukrainians’. The 
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next fundamental document in the sphere of national security ‘On the basics of national 
security’ was adopted on 19 June 2003. Article 7 of the law defines the threats to national 
interests and security in information sphere: 
 Restrictions on freedom of expression and access to information; 
 Distributing violence and pornography in media  
 Computer crime and computer terrorism; 
 Disclosure of confidential information which is owned by the state to public  
 Attempts to manipulate public opinion, especially by dissemination of false, 
incomplete or biased information. 
The law also touches upon the need to protect information sovereignty of Ukraine, to 
develop national information infrastructure and innovations and confront the 
monopolizing of the information sphere of Ukraine. For the first time, the terms of 
computer crime and computer terrorism were used in Ukrainian policy towards 
information and cyber security. (Buryachok; 2016).  However, both terms were not 
defined by law. The next strategic document which touches upon the issues of 
information and cyber security was adopted in 2012 and is called the Strategy of National 
Security. While the strategy among others defined the issues of information security in 
Ukraine due to the growing number of cyber crimes and attacks for the first time the 
intention to adopt a Strategy which would be focused specifically on cyber security issues 
was declared.  
As for cyber crimes, for the first time the criminal responsibility for conducting 
automating crimes was incorporated into the Criminal Code of 1960, article 198-1 in 
1994(). However, when the Criminal Code of independent Ukraine was adopted in 2001, 
issues related to cyber crimes took the whole chapter and three articles – 361 (unlawful 
usage of computers), 362 (stealing, acquisition and extortion of personal data), 363 (the 
distortion of usage of computers). The law № 908-IV adopted in 2003 amended the 
Criminal Code and Cyber crimes chapter by including the size of the fine for conducting 
cyber crimes. Finally, the Criminal Code was amended in 2004 by the Law № 2289-IV 
which incorporated few new provisions of the articles 361, 362, 363 mainly by specifying 
the types of cyber crimes.  
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Thus, together with the mentioned laws and regulations the following laws were 
regulating issues related to cyber security until 2014 and today: 
 On information 
 On National Security of Ukraine 
 On State Special Communications Service and information security of Ukraine 
 On Telecommunications,  
 On protection of information in telecommunication systems 
 On Access to Public information  
 On Defense of Ukraine 
 On the principles of domestic and foreign policy  
 On state organs of increased risk  
There are also Decrees of the President of Ukraine:  
 Doctrine on information security 
 Ukraine's National Security Strategy 
 Military Doctrine of Ukraine 
As well as decrees of Ukrainian government and National Security and Defence Council. 
As for international agreements Ukraine ratified the Council of Europe Budapest 
Convention on cyber crime in 2005. 
c) Recent changes of legislation in cyber security 
If looking at recent developments in cyber security legislation in Ukraine we can define 
two main periods of development of Ukrainian policy in cyber security. The first one 
took place in 2010-2013 when the first discussions on the importance of cyber security 
resulted in the first policy papers being drafted and normative acts adopted by respective 
state agencies. The second period began in 2014 after the war with Russia started and 
Ukraine became a victim of a large number of cyber attacks which according to 
Ukrainian officials were conducted by Russia (Poroshenko; 2017, Turchynov; 2017; 
Poltorak; 2017; Zolotukhin; 2017). 
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During the first period of development of NCS policy, the development of the law on 
cyber security as well as the cyber security strategy has begun. The idea to adopt a law on 
cyber security was first introduced in 2011 by State Service of Special Communication 
and Information Protection (SSSCIP). However, representatives of other state agencies 
involved in cyber security during the first meeting on the draft law started to argue on 
which responsibilities will be assigned to each agency and were afraid to lose control 
over some areas of responsibility. Therefore, the process of development and adoption of 
the law took much time and still has not finished (Dubov; 2017). From the other hand, 
state agencies involved in cyber security managed to find a compromise around a 
document which does not have a binding force - cyber security strategy. The Strategy 
was approved in 2016 and identified main cyber security threats to the country, 
introduced a clear division of responsibilities between state actors involved in cyber 
security as well as mentioned the important role of non-state actors in achieving cyber 
security. 
 
According to the Strategy, cyber security is viewed  as a ‘condition of protection of vital 
interests of citizens, society and state in cyberspace, which is achieved by a complex use 
of legal, organizational, informational measures and is based on the following principles: 
rule of law and respect for the rights and freedoms of citizens; Ukraine's national 
interests; openness, accessibility, stability and security of cyberspace; public-private 
partnerships, broad cooperation with civil society in the field of cyber security and cyber 
defense; proportionality and adequacy of the measures taken to tackle  existing and 
potential cyber risks; prioritizing preventive measures; inevitability of punishment for 
committing cyber crime; priority of development and support of scientific, technological 
and industrial potential of the country; international cooperation aimed at strengthening 
mutual trust in the field of cyber security and the development of common approaches in 
combating cyber threats; consolidation of efforts in the investigation and prevention of 
cyber crime, preventing the use of cyberspace in illegal and military purposes; ensuring 
democratic civilian control by established military forces and law enforcement agencies 
operating in the field of cyber security according to the laws of Ukraine’ (National Cyber 
Security Strategy of Ukraine, 2016). As for the role of non-state actors the Strategy used 
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a top-down approach according to which the development of legislation, policies and 
strategic documents which form a NCS strategy are done primarily by the government. 
The division of the responsibilities of the main state agencies involved in cyber security 
are highlighted in Chapter 5. 
As for cyber crimes, there were no additional amendments taking place with regard to the 
Criminal Code, however the National Police was strengthened by a new division 
specifically focused on cyber crimes – Cyber Police. Cyber Police was introduced in 
2015 as a part of the general reform of National Police in Ukraine in order to prevent, 
tackle and investigate cyber crimes. 
d) Conclusion 
Ukraine has been a target of cyber attacks and cyber crimes since proclaiming its 
independence however, the biggest number cyber attacks and cyber crimes took place 
after the beginning of conflict in the Eastern part of the country. In order to efficiently 
respond to the growing number of cyber threats Ukrainian government amended and 
updated its legislation regarding cyber security which until 2015 looked at cyber security 
within the broader concept of information security. The legislation on cyber crimes from 
the other hand has been lastly amended in 2005 and remains actual till today. Starting 
from 2011, the ideas on adopting a Law and a Strategy on cyber security have been 
introduced. While the law has provoked discussions among the stakeholders and has not 
still been adopted, the compromise was found around the Strategy which in comparison 
to the law does not have a binding force. The Strategy was adopted in 2016 and 
introduced the definition of cyber security and cyber threats to the country, division of 
responsibilities among state bodies involved in cyber security as well as mentioned the 
important role of non-state actors in achieving cyber security. 
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Process tracing of the causal mechanisms 
6. Coordination and cooperation on a state level 
a) Observation phase 
 
Coordination and cooperation of state bodies involved in cyber security is a prerequisite 
to achieving cyber resilience on a national level therefore this chapter will look at how 
efficiently such cooperation and coordination is build and identify challenges. The causal 
mechanism consists from the independent variable – cyber security at the state level, the 
element which has to be proved by looking at its factors - state organs efficiently 
cooperate and coordinate with each other to achieve cyber resilience on a national level 
and the dependent variable – cyber resilience on the national level. 
 
There is a big number of state bodies which are involved to different extent to providing 
cyber security and resilience in Ukraine. The main state bodies and the challenges to their 
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cooperation and coordination with each other will serve as factors which are used to 
prove the element of the causal mechanism.  
 
b) The analysis of the element’s factors 
 
According to the National Strategy on cyber security as of 27 January 2016 the main 
obligations on providing cyber security in Ukraine are assigned to such organs as: 
 Presidency of Ukraine.  
 National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.  
 The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.  
 The Security Service of Ukraine.  
 The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. 
 State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection.  
 The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. 
 The Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine.  
 The National Bank of Ukraine. 
 Respective national intelligence agencies  
According to the National Cyber Security Strategy, the State Service of Special 
Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine aims to improve the 
‘development and implementation of state policy in cyberspace; protection of state 
information resources; protection of critical infrastructure, state control in these areas; 
coordination of other bodies on cyber security in Ukraine; the implementation of 
organizational and technical measures to prevent, response to cyber attacks as well as 
elimination of their consequences, providing information on cyber threats and appropriate 
methods of protection against them; supporting the work of  state cyber center; auditing 
security of critical infrastructure’(the National Cyber Security strategy, 2016). In fact, the 
State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection is a crucial organ for 
providing cyber security to the country. It provides secure working conditions for all state 
web services, provides cryptography security and makes sure that the complex system of 
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information protection is implemented by all state and semi-state organizations. Complex 
system of information protection (CSIP) consists of different organizational and technical 
measures on information security and was adopted a number of respective Laws and 
regulations on information security in 1994 and 1998 (Law on information protection, 
1994; Decree on technical protection of information, 1998). The rapid development of 
digital security requires respective development of regulations and laws on a state level. 
CSIP is still regulated by the laws of regulations of 1990
th
 and is outdated (Dubov, 2017). 
Furthermore, the process of adoption of CSIP for state organs is expensive and long. The 
starting price for implementing CSIP is 80 000 UAH which according to state budget 
allocated for administration of state organs (annual budget for Parliament’s 
administration was 906,2 UAH in 2016) is very high. Furthermore, Ministry of finances 
became a victim of the cyber attack on 16 December 2016. The Ministry implemented 
CSIP on five of its servers however all of them were as easily broken as three other 
serves which did not use CSIP. Some state organs are not implementing CSIP since the 
penalty for not implementing it is around 3000 UAH or 3,5% of the price of the whole 
CSIP and it turns out cheaper to pay the fine in the end (Dubov, 2017). All these events 
prove the inefficiency of CSIP and the necessity for modification or a complete change 
by the State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection. 
The second organ responsible to cyber security of the country is the State Security 
Service which deals with the prevention, detection and elimination of crimes against the 
peace and security within the cyberspace of Ukraine. Furthermore, it deals with the 
implementation of counterintelligence and operational measures on combating 
cyberterrorism and cyber espionage, as well as critical infrastructure preparedness for 
possible cyber attacks (the National Cyber security strategy, 2017). However, the work of 
the Department for counterintelligence protection which is responsible for cyber security 
within State Security Service is kept secretive. The majority of speeches and interviews 
on cyber security given by officials of State security service proves that the attention to 
this topic is relatively high (Dubov, 2017). The former head of the State Security Service 
stated that `according to statistical data, damage caused to a country by cyber crimes and 
attacks is much higher than from traditional forms of crime’ (Kalinin, 2012). Due to the 
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rapid growth of technologies and wider use of internet and online services by citizens this 
number is increasing every year (State statics service, 2017). 
According to the National strategy on cyber security both State Service of Special 
Communication and Information Protection and State Security Service are responsible for 
licensing of secure transportation protocols AS1, AS2 and AS3 which may result in 
duplication of their work. However, in fact both organs managed to divide their 
responsibilities. State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection is 
revising the technical parameters of transportation protocols while State Security Service 
is making sure that paper work and documentation are prepared in accordance with the 
requirements (Zhora, 2017). 
The main role of fighting cyber crimes is played by the Ministry of internal affairs and 
national police. There is a special department on fight against cyber crimes within the 
Ministry, which is aimed at developing and implementing state policy on preventing and 
fighting with cyber crimes. The national police and its cyber police sector is responsible 
for prevention, detection, and fight with cyber crimes as well as raising public awareness 
about security in cyberspace (National Cyber security strategy, 2016). 
Complications and duplications may, and are taking place, on the understanding of 
Articles 361, 362, 363 of Criminal Code of Ukraine which refer to crimes in information 
and computer sphere. Sometimes it is hard to distinct a cyber crime from a cyber attack 
due to absence of knowledge about their purposes (Geers, 2017). Some cyber crimes 
even though targeted at private organizations or individuals may be carried out with the 
purpose of violation of territorial integrity or other issues which fall under the mandate of 
State Security Service (Dubov, 2017). 
Another governmental body responsible for cyber security in Ukraine is the Ministry of 
defense which is specialized at cyber defense of Ukrainian military forces. Its functions 
lie in taking measures on repelling military aggression in cyberspace; implementation of 
military cooperation with NATO, providing consistent protection against cyber threats 
(National Cyber Security strategy, 2017). There are two main departments responsible for 
cyber security within the Ministry of Defence – Administration of information 
technologies and Main administration on communication and information systems. The 
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functions of the departments include ‘organization of communication and automated 
command of troops in the Armed Forces of Ukraine; the operational management of 
telecommunication networks of Ukraine for the purpose of state defense; preparation of 
the communication system and automation of the control of troops of the Armed Forces 
of Ukraine and control over the preparation of telecommunication networks of Ukraine; 
participation in the implementation of state policy in the field of information security and 
counteraction to cyber threats in information and telecommunication systems of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine; participation in military cooperation on issues related to the 
development of the system and communication facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 
information security and counteraction to cyber threats’ (Administration of information 
technologies, 2017). Even though the functions of the Ministry of defense listed in the 
Strategy and other regulations are quite wide their participation in coordination meetings 
on cyber issues organized by the Council of National Security and Defense is quite 
limited. Ministry of defense exerts its main duties within the war time (Dubov, 2017) 
however, there is no definition of cyber war in Ukrainian legislation and Ukraine has 
never proclaimed its involvement in cyber war in Russia on the official level. 
The National bank acts as a regulator in protecting personal data. Furthermore, it is also 
tasked with ensuring cyber protection of critical bank infrastructure (Zhora, 2017). While 
the National Bank is focusing on ensuring that critical bank infrastructure is able to resist 
cyber crimes, it has fallen a victim of large cyber attacks at least twice within the 
researched period which resulted in a loss of 8 millions of UAH in the first cyber attack 
(Malchenyuk, 2017). These events show the lack of efficiency of the National bank in 
resisting cyber threats, which undermines its authority as regulator in the protection of 
critical infrastructure in banking sector.  
An attempt to coordinate the bodies responsible for cyber security of the country was first 
made in 2014 when the National Security and Defense Council became a coordinating 
body on cyber security in Ukraine. Its main aim is to establish a platform for strategic 
coordination of 6 main state bodies which are looking at cyber security from different 
angles (Malchenyuk, 2017). They hold meetings which involve all state stakeholders on 
cyber security to discuss up-to-dated issues few times per year. On the operational level, 
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the National coordination center of cyber security has been established. The Center is 
responsible for conducting research of national cyber threats and suggesting ways to 
tackle them; coming up with indicators on cyber security condition; evaluating national 
resources including legislative and executive capacities to confront cyber threats; 
incorporating best international practices on cyber security; developing methods on 
protecting critical infrastructure; developing means effective means of communication 
and information exchange between organs involved in providing cyber security; 
monitoring the process of harmonization of national regulations to the legislation of the 
EU and NATO; controlling the implementation of decisions taken by the National 
Council of Security and Defence (National Cyber Security strategy). Even though the 
center has quite a wide range of tasks its work ‘mainly is focused on collecting reports on 
the results of work of each organ involved in providing cyber security and creating one 
single report on how cyber security is provided on a state level’ (Zhora, 2017). One of the 
tasks of the Center is to come up with indicators on state’s cyber security. However, until 
June 2017 indicators were only partially agreed on in the State Service of Special 
Communication and Information Protection. As for general indicators, the Center still has 
not decided on methodology which should be used to develop them (Dubov, 2017). Such 
a slow pace of work and absence of indicators reveals that the coordination of state 
bodies in cyber security is not given enough attention, which is an important criterion for 
achieving cyber resilience. 
Even though attempts to ensure both strategic and operational coordination were made in 
2016 by adopting the National Strategy on cyber security, there was a lack of 
coordination between state organs and agencies which turn, perpetuates negative 
consequences through the tackling of cyber threats. The Council and the center were not 
fully carrying out the functions assigned to them. As of January 2016 until June 2017 
there were only few strategic meeting of the National Council of Security and Defence 
and one of the latest decisions it took on banning Russian social media, Vkontakte, 
provoked many discussions within Ukraine and abroad. 
The cooperation and coordination at state level on cyber security does exist according to 
Dubov, however ‘it is based on interpersonal connections of heads of agencies and 
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specialized departments’ (Dubov, 2017). Even though it is important that there is trust 
between state officials of respective state agencies in order to be able to respond fast to 
possible threats which is a prerequisite for resilience there must be a mechanism which 
would ensure regular meeting between all stakeholders in order to exchange information 
and develop common approaches (Geers, 2017). 
Some of the organs involved in providing cyber security are duplicating each other. 
Furthermore, such duplication is approved on a legislative level. According to the 
functions of the organs and agencies mentioned above both State Service of Special 
Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine and State Security Service are 
responsible for preventing and tackling cyber threats related to the protection of critical 
infrastructure of Ukraine. Both State Security System and National police are responsible 
for dealing with the large-scale cyber attacks (Zhora, 2017). However, in fact national 
police takes responsibility for ‘tackling large cyber crimes and attacks conducted by 
botnets while State Security Service is dealing only with attacks which may result in very 
negative consequences for Ukrainian economy and national security as well as classified 
information leaks’ (Dubov, 2017). 
Even though Ukraine adopted a strategy on national cyber security, there were no 
additional legislative acts and regulations adopted to provide a detailed mechanism of 
work for all the organs involved in cyber security as well responsibility for not complying 
with the norms declared there. Since Law has the strongest legislative power it has a 
potential to serve as an efficient coordination tool in cyber security. It may also 
contribute to achieving stronger cooperation among state organs due to clear clarification 
of their duties and responsibilities (Geers, 2017). A draft law which was suggested by a 
group of Members of Parliament in 2014 is still under consideration at the Verhovna 
Rada of Ukraine and is not planned to be approved in the nearest future due to a differing 
vision being held between different stakeholders (Zhora, 2017). 
There are many provisions of the draft Law on cyber security which provoke discussions 
among key stakeholders and prevent it from being adopted. Firstly, the Law introduces 
the division between ‘technical information’ and ‘content’ (Draft Law on Cyber Security, 
2017). Technical information regarding cyber security is thus can be checked by such 
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organs as State Security Service or State Service of Special Communication and 
Information Protection if there are some potential cyber risks. However, other state 
organs as well private sector fear that when checking the technical parameters of cyber 
protection these organs may also ‘spy’ or look at some sensitive or secret information of 
their interest not related to cyber security. Secondly, all state information resources 
according to the Law must be kept within one place according to the Law (Draft Law on 
Cyber Security, 2017). However, some of governmental web systems and data such as 
online state procurement tool Prozorro is kept on foreign servers which according to the 
new law will be considered illegal (Oleksiuk, 2017). Thirdly, the Ministry of Justice 
according to current Ukrainian legislation is keeping all state servers and has direct 
access to them. The new law suggests that these servers must be moved under the 
responsibility of SSSCIP which may result in losing or duplication of state information 
resources (Oleksiuk, 2017). There are also issues with security of state data center ‘which 
in current conditions cannot be regarded as safe state data center and be referred to in the 
law’ (Oleksiuk, 2017). Ukrainian data center is placed under the helicopter station in 
Parkovyi center which due to constant vibrations caused by helicopters is not safe to keep 
state data (Oleksiuk, 2017). 
Ukraine has never conducted complex cyber security training such as the series of 
trainings called ‘Cyberstorm’ which are regularly held in the United States and in some 
countries of the EU (United Kingdom and Estonia). The aim of such training is to work 
together with all actors (mainly state ones) which are involved in providing cyber 
security on solving some potential cyber threats. The existence of such trainings show the 
attitude and importance of cyber security topic in the country and serve as a great 
opportunity to enhance coordination and cooperation of state organs which is a 
prerequisite for achieving cyber resilience (Homeland Security, 2017). 
 
c) Conclusion 
Efficient cooperation and coordination at a state level is one of the four main criterion 
which contributes to achieving cyber resilience on a national level according to this 
research (Pernik, 2015; Rhinaud, Sundelius, 2014; Yost, 2003). Having looked at 
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political and governmental system involved in providing cyber security in Ukraine the 
following conclusions are made: 
1. Even though Ukraine adopted a Strategy on cyber security in 2016 as a 
compromise between proponents and opponents of the Law it does not stipulate 
responsibility and law enforcement in case of violations of its provisions. Furthermore, it 
does not touch upon the necessity to update or change CSIP, does not clearly 
differentiates some of the agencies’ functions; does not focus enough on regulating 
coordination between cyber security organs. 
2. Some organs involved in cyber security are not duplicating each other or have the 
potential to duplicate their work. The responsibilities of State Security Service and 
National Police are not clearly divided towards dealing with botnets and large-scale cyber 
crimes. Same applies to functions of State Security Service and State Service of Special 
Communication and Information Protection towards licensing of secure transportation 
protocols AS1, AS2 and AS3. SSSCIP has a complex structure being both international 
and national organ at the same time. While being tasked by so many responsibilities IT 
specialists working there are paid very low salaries comparing to average IT salaries on 
the job market. 
3. Complex system of information protection(CSIP) which is approved to set 
standards on information and cyber security within state organs and objects of critical 
infrastructure is outdated and often is regarded as a ‘burden’ for some of the state organs 
which opt to pay the fine for not implementing CSIP.  
4. Ukraine has never held, nor is planning to hold, complex cyber security training 
which would involve all stakeholders of national cyber security (state, businesses, civil 
society) to enhance cooperation and coordination between them. Similar training proved 
their usefulness in the majority of countries which focus upon achieving cyber resilience 
(for example in the UK, Estonia, US). 
Therefore, the first causal mechanism, can be proven only partially since the efficiency of 
their interaction is impeded by the absence of legislation. Fundamentally, there is an 
absence of a law relating to cyber security which would offer the provision of law 
enforcement and responsibility in case of violation of the law. Efficiency is further 
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impended by the duplication of tasks between some organs of state, in this instance the 
State Security Service and National Police, State Security Service and SSSCIP; the fact 
that Complex System of Information Protection (CSIP) is outdated, thereby does not 
fulfil its functions; an absence of indicators on state’s cyber security; inefficiency of work 
SSCIP caused by law salaries paid to IT specialists and complexity of SSCIP structure; 
and an absence of complex cyber security training involving all stakeholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Civil society and strong communities 
a) Observation phase 
 
Although traditionally main responsibility for providing cyber security of the country is 
played by the state, such non-state actors as NGOs can not only assist state in providing 
valuable expertise but also by raising awareness of society about existing cyber threats 
and responsible use of internet. In order to trace the process of the work of civil society in 
cyber security which contributes to cyber resilience on a national level the following 
causal mechanism is developed: 
 
Where civil society focusing on cyber security is independent variable; vibrant civil 
society cooperates with state and works with people to achieve cyber resilience on a 
national level is an element which has to proved by such factors as the work of civil 
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society organizations and the challenges they face. The independent variable of this 
causal mechanism is cyber resilience on a national level. 
 
 
b) The analyses of the element’s factors 
 
The work of non-governmental organizations, movements and associations is an indicator 
of the level of development of civil society (Tvedt, 2002). Civil society appeared in 
Ukraine only after proclaiming its independence in 1991 since within Soviet Union free 
and independent NGOs were either prohibited or worked under cover. It may take 
decades for a country in order to develop a vibrant and influential civil society therefore, 
Ukrainian civil society may considered to be young and not experienced comparing to 
some other European countries (Ghosh, 2014). 
In order to explore the level of development of Ukrainian civil society three categories of 
NGOs, movements and associations as well as volunteer and grass-root movements will 
be researched: 
1. NGOs and think-tanks supported by a state 
2. Volunteer and grass-root movements or organizations 
3. NGOs and projects supported by international partners 
Even though there are many ways of categorizing NGOs, the categories of this research 
are divided in accordance with the funding and support these organizations receive or not 
receive which influences the scale of their involvement in cyber security issues in 
Ukraine. Civil society organizations are also categorized according to their area of work 
to think tanks (involved in analytical work), non-governmental organizations with a clear 
structure and state registration, volunteer and grass-root movements.  
Even though there are 22,237 non-governmental organizations registered in Ukraine, only 
88 of them are working on different aspects of security (Ukrstat, 2016; Informjust, 2017). 
The component of cyber security has been established in many organizations mainly 
starting from year 2014 when the biggest cyber attacks against Ukraine took place. There 
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is also a large number of non-registered grass-root movements and organizations. For the 
purpose of this research, only the biggest and most influential think tanks, NGOs and 
grass-root movements were interviewed in order to measure the role of civil society in 
providing cyber resilience according to the criteria stipulated within the chapter on 
methodology (p. 10). 
  
NGOs and think-tanks supported by a state 
There is a number of think tanks which have a status of a State science and research 
institution on a national level as well as on a level of specific government bodies. 
‘National institute of strategic studies’ is an institution which works on a national level 
regarding different issues related to information and cyber security. Even though the 
institute is state funded, it often receives grants and funds for its research projects from 
other NGOs and foundations. Specifically, this NGO initiated the development of Cyber 
security strategy of Ukraine in 2005. Researchers of the institute developed its draft text 
which was later on agreed by all state stakeholders – state bodies, businesses, NGOs. 
Think-tanks supported by the state are often providing the draft texts of regulations, 
reports and statements on specific issues. National institute of strategic studies has been 
working on cyber security since early 2000
 
to fill the gap in national legislation towards 
this issue. Challenges related to the work such think tanks are often related to fewer 
opportunities to be independent and advocate its position with the help of media and 
other sources. At the same time, the access to government which such think-tanks have 
allows them to directly influence decision-making. Funding is also an important 
challenge since its main source comes from the budget which is usually small, however, 
institute fellows often get extra funding from different donors on specific projects. 
The All-Ukrainian Association on information security and information technologies was 
created in 2010 as an initiative for experts who are dealing with information and cyber 
security in order to protect the social, economic and other common interests of people 
and organizations which strive for development of the level of information and cyber 
security in Ukraine. The main tasks of the organization include cooperation with the 
government and local administrations as well as other non-state organizations in order to 
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enhance coordination and partnership between them; contribution to the development of 
information security and cyber security policy of Ukraine and the popularization of 
Ukrainian cyber security tools and software. With these aims, the association regularly 
conducts research and produces publications on pressing issues on information and cyber 
security in Ukraine in order to influence decision-making at a state level and inform 
public on how to ensure personal cyber security. In order to enhance cooperation between 
all the stakeholders of cyber security, the association holds an international forum on the 
protection of personal data and electronic signature. The fora is visited annually by 
around 200 participants representing both state and non-state actors working on 
information and cyber security in Ukraine (Oleksiuk, 2017). Apart from preparing 
researches and policy papers, the aforementioned forum is the most important area of 
work of the association since they give space for networking between government and 
civil society (Oleksiuk, 2017).  
When conducting their work, the head of the Association, Lilia Oleksiuk, identified 
several main challenges regarding the work of NGOs and other organizations which 
belong to the association (around 36 currently). One of the main challenges is the 
constant change of political power and legislation in the areas of information and cyber 
security as well as terms of work for non-governmental organizations. According to the 
recent change in law on non-governmental, voluntary organizations and associations only 
physical persons are able to be members of associations (Oleksiuk, 2017). Since some 
members of association belong are profit organizations or businesses they will have to 
terminate their membership in the association which will hinder its work (Oleksiuk, 
2017). Another challenging issue of the work of Association is the desire of every 
member to take leadership and act as a coordinator rather than contribute to ongoing 
projects on information and cyber security which significantly affects productivity of the 
Association (Oleksiuk, 2017). 
Cyber Warta is another organization which existed as an independent grass-root 
movement in Lviv for around 2 years until becoming one of Regional Administration’s 
projects (Chayka;2017). The aim of the organization is to raise awareness of children on 
security in the internet. Members of the organizations were providing lectures and 
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trainings for children of different ages. Since the organization began to grow fast and 
many schools asked for such trainings the organizations decided to elaborate a booklet 
and established a non-mandatory lesson at schools. For this purpose, Cyber Warta turned 
to Regional Administration to receive the support (Chayka, 2017). While ‘Lviv Regional 
Administration is quite flexible and open to volunteer initiatives, colleagues of Cyber 
Warta in other cities could not get access to regional administrations and receive support’ 
(Chayka, 2017). 
Think tanks, volunteer and grass-root movements or organizations 
The specific of this category of civil society organizations lies in a higher level of 
independence and reliance on volunteers and independent contributors. Also, these 
organizations are often limited in terms of financial and human resources allocated for 
projects.  
People, working in such organizations are passionate and active towards their initiatives 
but they can invest a limited time to their initiatives since this not their source of income. 
(Foweraker, 2001). 
One of the most active NGOs which are specifically working within cyber security 
domain is Ukrainian Information Security Group. Members of this NGOs are working on 
advocating civil society’s vision to the government through Civic Councils and annually 
organize the biggest Cyber Secure Conference in Ukraine – UISGCON (Ukrainian 
Information Security Conference). Due to the low level of trust to civil society and 
absence of will to cooperate members of the Council who are representing the state are 
constantly failing to show up to regular meetings. (Styran, 2017). This makes the work of 
the NGO in the area of advocacy inefficient.  
Another organization which is an active member of Ukrainian civil society involved in 
cyber security is the Center for Army, Convertion and Disarmament studies. The center is 
mainly involved in analytical work. Therefore, it belongs in the category of think tanks. 
Even though the center focuses on different issues regarding security and defence of 
Ukraine, the cyber security area of research became one of the central since 2014. The 
main aim of the cyber security component within think tank is to build a bridge between 
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technical experts on cyber security and policy makers (Radkevych, 2017). This is also the 
biggest challenge of the think tank where experts of mainly technical background are 
working. The center also strongly advocates toward better informing of society about 
cyber risks and secure use of cyber space though press-briefings, public events and 
thematic conferences. Due to the limited resources allocated to the cyber component the 
responsibility for informing and training society on how to use internet in a secure 
manner should be put on a state and businesses for which the consequences of cyber 
crimes and attacks are the most serious (Radkevych, 2017). 
There is also a number of think tanks in Ukraine focusing on issues in political science 
however majority of them are very small and range of questions they cover is too broad. 
This leads to relatively low quality of research they produce. Furthermore, their 
researches are in most cases not taken into account by decision makers which also proves 
that they did not manage to build bridges with governmental bodies or other stakeholders. 
The biggest grass-root movement involved in providing cyber security in Ukraine is 
‘Ukrainian Cyber Forces’. Although the main goal of the organization is to actively fight 
with separatist forces in the east of Ukraine using offensive cyber measures, Ukrainian 
Cyber Forces dedicate a large part of their efforts towards cyber resilience of Ukrainian 
society. During Euromaidan, annexation of Crimea and after the beginning of conflict in 
the East there were dozens of volunteers contributing to the efforts of the organization. 
However, in 2016 only 3 members of the organization remained active. This trend relates 
to all volunteer and grass-root movements on cyber security in Ukraine, which reported 
the decrease of number of volunteers within their organizations (Dokunin, 2017; 
Interviewee 2; 2017). In three years of their work Ukrainian Cyber Forces blocked 19 
millions of US dollars on 455 accounts of separatists, closed 147 separatists’ websites, 
hacked separatist’s 1,2 terabite of separatist’s data from emails, social media accounts. 
(Dokunin, 2017). In the area of cyber security, Ukrainian Cyber Forces are working on 
raising awareness of society on cyber protection. For this purpose, a website 
Websecurity.com.ua as well as the Facebook page, Cyber Security Forces (3,648 
followers) was established. The biggest challenge which Ukraine Cyber Forces are facing 
is improving cooperation with the government. There were a number of statements and 
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reports submitted to the State Security Service, CERT-UA, as well other state bodies the 
cyber security of which had to be improved (Dokunin; 2017). Furthermore, there were a 
number of state websites ‘taken’ or blocked by separatists or Russians as of 2014. 
According to Dokunin, only after 3 years and a number of appeals by Ukrainian Cyber 
Forces and other volunteer movements State Security Service began to block and 
investigate them. The cooperation between government and Cyber Forces is undermined 
by the low level of trust between them. Cyber Forces have never made an attempt to 
establish cooperation with government bodies while government bodies never took 
organization’s recommendations seriously enough (Dokunin; 2017).  
Another grass-root movement Cyber Shield is actively working within social media 
websites such as Facebook and, till May 2017, Vkontakte. Their Facebook pages – Cyber 
Shield of Ukraine, Cyber Ukrop, FalconsFlame, Trinity and Рух8 belong to the Ukrainian 
Facebook pages with the biggest followers reach holding 29th and 30th place 
retrospectively (top 30; 2017). Among other goals such as combatting with Cyber Berkut 
and Russian trolls on social media, the movement is engaged in raising awareness of 
basic cyber security measures among Ukrainian citizens. Their information toolkit 
‘Recommendations on cyber security’ has been published not only on social media 
among followers but also on wider Ukrainian media outlets such as 1plus1, Pravda.UA 
and Radio Free Europe. (Interviewee 2; 2017). In contrast to Ukrainian Cyber Forces 
which are trying to influence decision-making of Ukrainian government, Cyber Shield 
works anonymously using media to increase cyber resilience of Ukrainian society. The 
challenges which the organization is facing is the decrease in volunteerism among IT and 
cyber security specialists and a large number of Russian-backed and separatists’ trolls on 
social media who are trying to undermine their work. 
NGOs, think tanks and projects supported by international partners 
There are quite a few influential NGOs which are funded primarily by donors and 
international organizations. Due to better funding, the structure and scope of work of 
these organizations are more clear and wider. The biggest donor of Ukrainian NGOs 
involved in cyber security in Ukraine are the United States, Great Britain, Italy. European 
countries which are interested in sharing their experience and provide assistance in 
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Ukraine are also Estonia and Czech Republic – countries which as Ukraine belong to 
post-soviet and post-communist spaces. 
ISACA, Kyiv Chapter is the biggest international NGO on cyber security in Ukraine. Due 
to its wide international scope and well-established partnerships in 180 countries, ISACA 
is the most active NGO (Rybalchenko, 2017) which facilitates the exchange of 
experience between Ukrainian and international partners; provides certification of IT 
specialists of both state and commercial institutions; prepares policy papers and 
researches regarding cyber security issues in Ukraine; raises awareness on secure use of 
internet for citizens of Ukraine. Furthermore, ISACA is involved in enhancing the level 
of education on cyber security in Ukraine. Since the level of cyber security expertise in 
Ukrainian Universities is quite low (Malchenyuk, 2017) ISACA initiated the ‘Academic 
Advocate Program’ which boosts the knowledge of skills of Ukrainian professors and 
teachers. The main challenge the organization faces in Ukraine is related to cooperation 
with the Ukrainian government. Instead of reforming the management system of 
Ukrainian bodies responsible for cyber security government turn to ‘fast decisions’ 
related to mainly changing technical parameters of cyber protection when the attack 
occurs (Yankovskyi, 2017). There is also a low level of trust between the government and 
the organization. Hence, changing the governmental approach to cyber security, which is 
a key to cyber resilience, is ISACA’s most important area of work (Rybalchenko;2017). 
The ISС project of USAID in Ukraine is another initiative with foreign funding focusing 
on increasing Ukrainian cyber resilience, which focuses specifically on improving NGOs, 
media’s and human rights activists’ capabilities to counter cyber risks. The project was 
established in the end of 2013 after the government’s efforts to steal private data and 
undermine the work of media and independent NGOs (Kostynyan; 2017). Since that time 
around 40 organizations received support from ISC project as well as thousands of people 
who were attending digital security trainings on the protection of social media, emails 
and other communication tools, technical protection, internet protection. The main goal 
of the organization is to make the beneficiaries more prone to cyber risks and sustainable 
in cyber security domain (Kostynyan; 2017). The project is of ‘pure civil society 
character’, which does not stipulate any cooperation with government or businesses 
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which makes it flexible and efficient. At the same time, the project is not being 
communicated well -there are only few mentioning about it in media and there is no 
application form though which any NGO which have cyber risks may apply. 
Furthermore, the majority of trainings are provided in the capital of the country which 
may lead to unequal geographical distribution. 
c) Conclusion 
 
In order to achieve cyber resilience on a national level vibrant civil society working on 
cyber security should cooperate with state and works with people to achieve cyber 
resilience. Therefore, having looked at the biggest NGOs, think tanks and grass-root 
movements which form Ukrainian civil society working in the field of cyber security the 
following challenges were identified: 
1. The number of non-governmental organizations on cyber security is very low. 
Comparing to NGOs working in other fields cyber security NGOs or NGOs which have a 
cyber security component in its work constitute less than 1% percent of overall number. 
2. The efficiency of those civil society organizations working on cyber security is 
hindered by the scarcity of financial and human resources, especially in the case of 
voluntary and grass-roots movements, independent think tanks and state-backed research 
institutes which are mainly financed from the state budget;  
3. A decrease of volunteerism in the country caused by ‘tiresome’ from active 
volunteering during Euromaidan and the war in the East of Ukraine. 
4. A large number of cyber trolls sponsored by Russians and separatists which 
undermine the activities of Ukrainian hacktivists such as Ukrainian Cyber Forces and 
Cyber Shield. 
5. Constant change within political power and legislation affecting the areas of 
information and cyber security as well as terms of work for non-governmental 
organizations. 
6. Ambitions of members of NGOs to take leadership positions rather than 
contribute to ongoing projects within their status. 
7. Absence of trust between the government and civil society. 
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8. Inefficiency of the work of state bodies which result in slow decision-making and 
response to recommendations or appeals of civil society organizations. 
9. The concentration of the work of civil society organization in the capital of the 
country which means that citizens on the local level may stay less aware on cyber 
security 
 
Thus, due to the abovementioned challenges, the Ukrainian civil society working on 
cyber security cannot be called vibrant. Efficient cooperation with the state exists only 
between state-backed research institutes. Other NGOs, think tanks and movements have 
either failed to establish such cooperation or never tried to start it or are cooperating with 
state bodies. Organizations which adopt such a position experience an absence of trust 
between civil society and the state and slow reaction times to their proposals. Work with 
people aimed at raising awareness on what how to stay secure in cyber space is more 
vibrant. For this purpose, civil society is using such communication channels as 
traditional and social media as well organize lectures and trainings on cyber security for 
different age groups. However, the scope of their work is limited by the lack of resources 
both human and financial as well as often unequal geographical distribution when the 
majority of activities are being conducted in country’s capital. 
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8. Public-public partnerships 
a) Observation phase 
Another criterion of achieving cyber resilience on national level is related to active 
involvement of businesses into national cyber security in the form of private-public 
partnerships. In order to trace the process of public-private partnerships development in 
Ukraine the following causal mechanism is used: 
 
Where business providing cyber security is an independent variable; businesses form 
public-private partnerships with the state to achieve cyber resilience on a national level 
is an element which has to be proved by looking at factors which either contribute to or 
challenge the existence of public-private partnerships in Ukraine. Cyber resilience on a 
national level serves as dependent variable as well. 
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b) The analysis of the element’s factors 
 
 A Strategy on Cyber Security mentions about the important role of cooperation with 
business sector in the sphere of cyber security. However, it does not go into details and 
explanations of possible forms of involvement of businesses, sharing of information and 
achieving mutual trust between the state and business. Since the Strategy does not 
mention the private-public partnership form of cooperation such instrument is not 
regulated even on the level of a legally non-binding document such as a strategy.  
However, a draft law on Cyber Security adopted in the first reading by Verhovna Rada of 
Ukraine attempts to define such cooperation. The law is widely criticized by 
representatives of businesses for not being involved in the elaboration of the law (Zhora, 
2017). Furthermore, the new law apart from the concept of information introduces the 
concept of technical information which relates only to system administration and other 
content related to cyber security. Technical information of a respective company thus is 
subject of control by a state in case of cyber risk or actual attack related to national 
security. However, some representatives of business claimed that such division is very 
disputable since government by claiming the need to check technical information may 
use also other data of a company in its own purposes (Dubov, 2017). Furthermore, 
according to the draft law, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine will have to adopt a decree 
which will provide the list of critical infrastructures of Ukraine. Majority of possible 
critical infrastructure objects which will be confirmed in the decree are owned by private 
sector at least on the 50-50 basis. Critical infrastructure objects according to the draft law 
will have to be CSIP licensed by State Service of Special Communication and 
Information. Incorporation of licensing on a mandatory basis is viewed by some business 
representatives as a possible way to put pressure on private sector and reduce their 
freedoms (Dubov;2017). 
Therefore, on a policy level there are many issues which are hindering the facilitation of 
cooperation between state and businesses. Due to a number of disputes between state 
bodies and businesses regarding introduction of technical information concept, CSIP 
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licensing and poor communication and consultation processes the law which among 
others is aimed to introduce private-public partnerships in cyber security has not been 
adopted. Poor communication with businesses and other stakeholders is caused by 
reluctance to involve in consultations with large number of interested parties which may 
take additional time and resources (Dubov; 2017). This proves that the state is not ready 
to facilitate cooperation with businesses on a policy level. 
From operational perspective, the state has a need to attract expertise and funding from 
private sector. For example, there is a necessity to establish additional CERTs in Ukraine 
to be able to protect critical infrastructure and state bodies from cyber attacks.  Just to 
compare how limited Ukrainian potential is: Germany possess 33 CERTs, Poland – 26 in 
different areas both private and public. ‘There will be no additional resources allocated to 
opening regional CERTs and CERTs of critical infrastructure’ (Zolotukhin, 2017). Since 
majority of Ukrainian critical infrastructure belongs to business the state cannot be 
responsible for providing its cyber security – state’s role can solely lie in monitoring of 
cyber security, sharing of information and best practices (Cys-CERT representative; 
2017). There are many international experts involved in drafting the strategy of work of 
private CERTs in Ukraine as well as capacity building, however, Ukrainian private sector 
is expected to run such CERTs (Zolotukhin, 2017). Ministry of energy of Ukraine is 
currently looking for partners as well international ones to establish a CERT which would 
tackle cyber threats targeted at electric grids. There are also two CERTs being established 
by the Ministry of Defense and State Security Service, however, the funding still remains 
the issue and both bodies are holding negotiations with private companies to attract extra 
funds (Radkevych, 2017).  
Another issue is related to CERT-UA capacities and funding. The main issue which 
influences the efficiency of work of CERT-UA is the low amount of salary paid to IT 
specialists working there. For example, the average salary of an IT specialist in Ukraine 
was 2,500 USD (Shymkiv, 2016) while the salary of a civil servant on the level of 
specialist was 3618 UAH (Cabinet of Minister’s regulation 292, 2016).  Good IT 
specialists can easily find a well-paid job in the private sector therefore, state service is 
chosen either by true patriots or low-qualified specialists. According to Radkevych, 
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students who are studying cyber security after or during graduation work for state bodies 
such as CERT-UA, however after one or two years take jobs in private sector. 
(Radkevych, 2017). Therefore, if looking at Ukraine’s capabilities in preventing and 
fighting cyber threats the issue of human resources should be solved first of all because in 
the end these are cyber security specialists who are tackling cyber risks. For this purpose, 
the government is looking to additional funding or form of partnership with business to 
solve this issue.  
Despite all the challenges, according to former officer of CERT-UA, this body managed 
to build trustworthy relations with internet providers both local and national which is 
crucial for fast and efficient reaction to cyber attacks (Cys-CERT, 2017). However, such 
relations were build according to personal connections and trust rather than private-public 
partnerships. Therefore, such cooperation exists de-facto according to the specific needs 
but is not systematic and institutionalized (Cys-CERT representative, 2017).  
If looking at the issue from business point of view, the number of Ukrainian cyber 
security businesses working on Ukrainian market is not high comparing to other 
European states. Majority of cyber security companies are working with international 
clients mainly from Europe and the US. However, even though there is a need of the state 
to more fruitfully cooperate with business especially on the operational level as many 
experts mention (Dubov; 2017; Zhora;2017; Zolotukhin; 2017, Malchenyuk; 2017), the 
businesses which are working in Ukraine are not cooperating with the state to a large 
extent due to such reasons as: inefficient work of state bodies, low level of trust, fear of 
losing independence, reputation risks, and skepticism about state’s role in cyber security, 
low or no funding a state can pay for their services. 
As for inefficient work of state bodies, the head of Berezha Security company, Vlad 
Styran, mentions: “We are trying as much as we can to avoid cooperation with the state 
due to complicated procedures of establishing and conducting such cooperation” (Styran; 
2017). In the event of a cyber crime or cyber attack the period of time needed to file a 
request and receive a feedback for example from Cyber Police may take up to a year 
(Styran; 2017). “When a cyber security company files a request to the state law-
enforcement agencies about investigation the procedure is very tedious and long” (Cys-
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CERT representative, 2017).  Since cyber crimes are occurring rapidly, this leaves a state 
very little time to react and investigate the crime. However, this issue does not relate only 
to the work of Ukrainian state bodies – bureaucratic and complicated system of state 
procedures cannot efficiently cope with extremely rapid and sophisticated cyber crimes 
or attacks happening everywhere in the world (Geers, 2017). 
This leads to another issue related to general skepticism of businesses about the role of 
the state in providing cyber security. A cyber security expert Serhiy Radkevych claims 
that ‘the state should play primary role in providing cyber security of the country – its 
functions should only be regulatory and legislative ones’ (Radkevych, 2017). When the 
state ‘interferes with its recommendations it only worsens the situation’ since it does not 
have good expertise and capacities in cyber security (Styran, 2017). Furthermore, it took 
8 years for the country to adopt only the Strategy on cyber security and ‘neither 
representative of businesses was consulted about the laws which are currently under 
consideration of Parliament’ (Zhora, 2017). The fact that the state does not have good 
expertise on cyber security and is not willing to consult with businesses raises the 
question of its capacities to provide cyber security. 
Another reason which prevents businesses to actively cooperate with the state in the form 
of private-public partnerships is the financial one. ‘When announcing tenders or calling 
for partners the state is searching first of all for the cheapest service on the market, 
regardless of its quality’ (Styran, 2017). This fact demonstrates how ‘important’ cyber 
security for the country is. ‘State bodies operating in the field of cyber security do not 
have capabilities and expertise to provide quality control of the services provided so the 
only criteria when selecting a contractor is the low price’ (Styran, 2017). 
Businesses tend not to trust the state much in their work. ‘This country is very corrupt 
and not predictable, issues related to cyber security are covered by secrecy and 
confidentiality’ (Rybalchenko, 2017). If making a request to state bodies on any issue the 
answer you receive is usually either general and not even related to the request (Dubov, 
2017). Such attitude to providing public information ruins the possibility to establish trust 
between businesses and state. As mentioned before in chapter 4, the intention of a state to 
introduce the concept ‘technical information’ which would allow State Security Service 
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to conduct перевірки of businesses as stipulated in the draft law On Cyber security 
makes businesses worried about confidentiality of its data and possibility of the state to 
spy on them (Dubov, 2017). Same applies to possible cyber crimes conducted against 
cyber security businesses’ clients. Some cyber security companies choose to conduct 
investigations by themselves rather than turn to Cyber Police which may get access to 
their data which then can be used against them (Styran, 2017). Some companies are also 
hesitant to share information with the government (Jagasia, 2017). ‘Since the government 
would not be able to provide all data regarding potential cyber crimes because some 
information may be classified or confidential, many companies feel that the information 
sharing would end up as a one-way relationship’ (Jagasia, 2017: 3). Cys-CERT, one of 
the biggest cyber security companies in Ukraine is constantly informing state bodies and 
law-enforcement agencies about cyber risks. However, state agencies have never reacted 
to such ‘good-will’ actions of the company. Furthermore, in few cases ‘law-enforcement 
agencies suspected cyber security companies in cyber crimes or attacks since they shared 
with them some ‘suspicious’ data’ (Cys-CER, 2017). 
Reputational risks are another reason for why not businesses are not willing to establish 
public-private partnerships. Over the last 3 years Ukraine has become a target of large 
scale cyber attacks, Failure to cope with cyber attacks in case of existence of public-
private partnership between a state and businesses may have a negative influence on 
reputation of businesses (Deloitee, Risk Management, 2017) Therefore, some businesses 
decide not to risk its reputation which is critical for their purposes. Moreover, in some 
cases the involvement of the state bodies leads to escalation of the attack or crime which 
in Ukrainian case are often targeted at undermining the reputation of a state (Nesterenko, 
2017). 
Though there is large number of reasons which prevent businesses as well as a state to 
establish private-public partnerships there are few successful initiatives coming both from 
a state and business. One of the most successful examples of concrete cooperation 
between cyber security business and the state took place over tackling the consequences 
of a cyber attack targeted against an electric grid in Ivano-Frankivsk and Kyiv. Cyber 
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security company ESET provided its expertise and software tools immediately after the 
attack took place (Zolotukhin, 2017). 
After the biggest cyber attack targeted at Ukraine in 2017 by notPetia virus Trade and 
Industry Chamber of Ukraine which is aimed at supporting Ukrainian and foreign 
business in Ukraine has established Anti crises Center of cyber protection which consists 
of both state bodies and businesses. The companies with one of the greatest expertise on 
the Ukrainian market – Privatbank, IT Laboratory, Axon Partners and other 27 companies 
and experts to support businesses affected by the virus with their expertise and software 
tools completely voluntarily. From the other hand, cyber security state bodies which 
belong to the Center – Cyber Police, SSCIP, State Security Service.  
National Bank of Ukraine established a Cyber Protection Center (CSIRT-NBU) in order 
to immediately react to cyber threats and share information between banks and police. 
The aim of the Center is also to elaborate efficient plans on how to tackle cyber threats. 
The way National Bank cooperates with business is considered to be the most efficient if 
comparing to other state bodies by many experts. Due to immediate information sharing 
as well comparatively big investments in cyber security, banking sector is considered to 
be the most protected from cyber security point of view. 
Neither of the mentioned cooperation projects were registered or established in the form 
of private-public partnerships. Thus, while there are sporadic initiatives of both 
businesses and the state in cyber security such relations have never aimed at long-lasting 
cooperation from both sides due to the reasons mentioned above.  
 
c) Conclusion 
Cooperation between business and state remains on the low level in the sphere of cyber 
security. A private-public partnership form of relations between businesses and 
government in cyber sphere is not stipulated de-jure even though there were intentions to 
introduce a provision on private-public partnerships within the draft law on Cyber 
Security. 
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From the state’s point of view there is the interest in developing cooperation with 
business on the operational level mainly when it comes to attracting additional financial 
resources due to limited budget allocated to cyber security. There are many examples 
when state bodies and agencies have called businesses with specific propositions of 
cooperation, which were seen by many companies as unequal or not relevant (Styran, 
2017). On strategic level from the other hand, state bodies do not involve businesses in 
decision-making process, leaving majority of them behind policy elaborations. This may 
be explained by low trust of state to businesses; unwillingness to share power with other 
stakeholders; fear of protracted negotiations due to a large number of interested parties 
(Dubov, 2017). To sum up, such attitude of state towards private sector does not 
stimulate the establishment of fruitful cooperation among others in the form of private-
public partnerships. 
From business point of view there is little interest in establishing private-public 
partnerships with a state. The following reasons which are hindering business’ 
involvement in cyber security on a national level were identified: 
1. Inefficiency of work of state bodies caused by complicated and time-consuming 
procedures of information sharing and other services 
2. Low budget allocated to cyber security which leads to the search for the cheapest 
services rather than the ones of the best quality. 
3. Low trust of businesses to state bodies which have a reputation of being corrupt 
and not open. Fear that sharing of information with a state would end up in a one-way 
process. 
4. General skepticism about the state’s capacity to provide cyber security due to 
little investments in this sphere and lack of expertise 
5. Possible reputational risks in the event of success of a cyber attack targeted at the 
state. 
Thus, in order to achieve cyber resilience on a national level among others, there should 
be an efficient cooperation between businesses and the state in the form of private-public 
partnerships. Having interviewed representatives of the biggest cyber security businesses 
as well as former and current civil servants engaged in providing cyber security on the 
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existence of such cooperation it has been proved that the sporadic events of private-
public cooperation on cyber security cannot in fact be called private-public partnership. 
There are many reasons which prevent such cooperation and they do not seem to be 
solved in the nearest future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Societal resilience 
a) Observation phase 
 
The last criterion of achieving cyber resilience on a national level is ensuring quality 
information on cyber security education at schools, Universities and within society. In the 
end, it is a human who is responsible for security breaches (Radkevych, 2017). Therefore, 
‘comprehensive, effective end user awareness training and education is recognized as the 
single most effective component in the prevention of data loss or a security breach’ 
(Lohrmann, 2012:7).   
In order to trace the process of achieving societal resilience the following causal 
mechanism is developed: 
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Where cyber security awareness is an independent variable; cyber security education and 
general awareness is provided to people to achieve cyber resilience on a national level is 
an element which will be proved by looking at the factors such as IT and cyber security 
education in public and private schools, higher education in cyber security and general 
cyber security awareness. The dependent variable is cyber resilience on a national level. 
b) The analysis of the element’s factors 
 
IT and cyber security education in public and private schools  
Very little attention is given to information and cyber security in Ukrainian public 
schools. Such issues as personal data protection, security of passwords and cyber bullying 
are important to be addressed from the early age (Brady, 2010). According to the latest 
educational program adopted by the Ministry of Education, only one class of the subject, 
‘Internet Security’ should be provided to pupils of the primary school. Furthermore, this 
class is not mandatory and should be held within the scope of extracurricular activities. 
Usually, Internet security class is held at International Day of Secure Internet which is 
celebrated every year on February 6. ‘Since children start using internet in the very early 
age it is crucial to provide enough training on how to stay secure in cyber space: one hour 
of the internet security class is definitely not enough’ (Zolotukhin, 2017). There is a clear 
generation gap between civil servants who work in the Ministry of education who started 
using internet in their middle age and children who are born in the internet era which 
results in ‘almost no education on information security at primary schools’ (Oleksiuk, 
2017). After being pushed by civil society, the Ministry of education has suggested to 
work on introducing 8 hours of internet security classes at schools, however, according to 
experts this is not enough (Oleksiuk 2017; Zolotukhin, 2017). Another problem concerns 
the absence of internet in some regional schools in Ukraine where consequently the 
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classes on internet security are ignored due to the absence of the problem (Oleksiuk, 
2017). 
As for secondary school, pupils start learning information security within the Informatics 
class. However, even though this class runs from fifth till ninth grade information 
security is taught only during the last year (Ministry of education, 2017). Furthermore, 
the educational program does not include any notion of cyber security and its basics. In 
order to fill this gap a private school Computer Academy suggested a new program on 
Informatics which would include more hours on information and cyber security to the 
Ministry of education on a voluntary basis. However, ‘the Ministry considered this 
initiative as PR project of the Computer Academy and refused to collaborate’ (Oleksiuk, 
2017). According to Oleksiuk, this happened in the absence of understanding by the 
Ukrainian government of the public-private partnership concept (Oleksiuk, 2017).  
Apart from public schools, cyber security is taught at few private schools and training 
centers -InformSecurity, Domina Security, Academy IT, Network Academy Lanit, 
Computer Academy. The first two schools are considered to be leading ones since they 
focus specifically on cyber security issues. Another three schools are teaching cyber 
security among other IT programs. The audience of the private schools are usually 
graduate students, recent graduates or adults wishing to retrain to change their current job 
or get at new one. Computer Academy among others is teaching IT to a younger 
audience, usually pupils who want to learn this sphere more deeply. Private schools 
which teach cyber security are comparatively expensive, therefore, not everyone wishing 
to work in this field can afford them and the number of members of such schools is 
comparatively low (Potii, Oliynykov, 2016).  
The negative consequences of the little attention given to information and cyber security 
in public schools and little interest to private schools are not only poor skills and 
knowledge in cyber security but also low interest in pursuing education and career in this 
field. 
 Higher education on cyber security 
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Even though there are degree studies in Ukrainian Universities on Information security 
taught at 7 Universities all over Ukraine there is a lack of cyber security experts in 
Ukraine who received specific education in cyber security (Potii; Oliynykov, 2016). 
Every year around 500 students graduate from Universities with a BA degree in 
information security which constitutes less than 1% of the total number of students who 
enter Ukrainian Universities each year (Table 3; Potii; Oliynykov, 2017). Thus, the 
majority of cyber security experts in Ukraine are IT specialists who have learned cyber 
security themselves (Malchenyuk, 2017). The reason for low popularity of information 
and cyber security, according to many experts lies in the rapid development of cyber 
threats and ways to protect from them which educational institutions can barely follow 
(Styran; 2017, Kostynyan; 2017, Rybalchenko 2017; Geers, 2017; Christensen, 2016). 
‘There is no need to have a BA degree program in Cyber Security which lasts normally 4 
years – Universities will not cope with the approving of special literature which is 
constantly changing’ (Styran, 2017). However, the same argument may be applied 
towards other IT degrees which are also developing very fast today but nevertheless exist 
in Universities. Low number of information security graduates may also be explained as 
mentioned above by little attention paid to this field in schools which means that pupils 
do not have a chance to look at the issues related to information and cyber security and 
consider pursuing career and education in this sector. 
Up to 2017 there were no degree programs in Cyber Security in Ukraine. Cyber security 
courses are taught within Information Security degree programs. The idea of adding 
Cyber security degree programs in addition to Information Security degree programs is 
contested by many experts within Ukraine due to different understanding of the terms 
information security and cyber security which are often used interchangeably.  On one 
hand, Information Security covers broad issues related to ‘information and the protection 
of information whether be it physical or computerized’ (Kissel, 2013). From the other 
hand, cyber security is focusing more specifically on ‘protection of cyberspace and use of 
it against any sort of crime (related/not related to information)’ such as, for example 
cyber terrorism and cyber sabotage (Kissel, 2013).  Having in mind the ongoing war with 
the Russian Federation and the large number of cyber threats to the country, the Ministry 
of Education introduced a Cyber Security BA degree program which will be taught 
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separately from Information Security. ‘Given the Russian aggression, we are in desperate 
need of cyber security professionals. The approval of the new standard will allow us to 
train high-level specialists ready to apply their knowledge in practice and respond to the 
current challenges’ (Kovtunets, 2017). This decision was widely criticized by cyber 
security experts in Ukraine due to lack of understanding about who will be developing 
teaching plans and teaching this degree program in Universities. (Dubov, 2017; Styran, 
2017; Malchenyuk, 2017; Oleksiuk, 2017).  Furthermore, as mentioned above, the 
efficiency of the program is impeded by the fast development of cyber threats. 
Some interviewees claimed that Cyber Security should be taught within Master’s degree 
programs since they are more specific and last for only one or maximum two years 
(Malchenyuk, 2017; Dubov, 2017). Thus, former Microsoft cyber security expert Igor 
Malchenyuk initiated establishing a Master’s degree program in cyber security at the 
Ukrainian Catholic University which is considered to be one of the most prestigious 
Universities in Ukraine (Malchenyuk, 2017). However, due to bureaucratic complications 
and the absence of official educational specialty in cyber security the program has still 
not been established (Malchenyuk, 2017).  
Currently, there is one Master’s program in cyber security which is funded by the 
European Commission and organized together with European Universities. The program 
is called Educating the Next generation experts in Cyber Security: the new EU-
recognized Master’s program (ENGENSEC) and includes among others 7 Ukrainian 
Universities (Lviv Politechnik University website, 2017). The program lasts 2 years and 
is targeted at knowledge exchange between European countries on cyber security. Due to 
the fact that the program is run on an international basis within Erasmus+ agreement with 
Ukraine there were no complications with setting up this program in Ukraine. According 
to Rybalchenko, this degree program on cyber security has been the most efficient in 
Ukraine so far, however, the number of students who were involved in it (around 30) was 
quite low due to the program structure and funding (Rybalchenko, 2017).  
There are a few initiatives of NGOs which support Ukrainian higher education in cyber 
and information security. ISACA – one of the biggest international NGOs in Ukraine 
introduced an ISACA Academic Advocate Program which provides assistance to 
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professors who want to increase their knowledge and skills in teaching cyber and 
information security. (ISACA website, 2017). The program provides access to ISACA’s 
e-library as well as methodology and research of ISACA worldwide. Members of the 
program receive a free subscription to ISACA Journal and participate in meetings and 
webinars of more than 10 000 ISACA members worldwide. Six out of eight Universities 
which teach information security are already a part of the ISACA program (Rybalchenko, 
2017). 
 
General cyber security awareness 
Educating citizens to the dangers they face when conducting business online is an 
effective first line of defense when it comes to cyber security (Pernik, 2016). Cyber 
security awareness projects are extremely important in Ukraine due to the poor education 
on information and cyber security which people receive in primary and secondary 
schools. There is an expectation that such projects will fill the gap of knowledge and 
skills on information and cyber security of Ukrainian citizens.   
There are two main ways of raising awareness of cyber security among the population 
and thus strengthening societal resilience – through advertisements and banners in the 
media and on the streets and by holding training, courses and events targeted at specific 
groups of the population (Radkevych, 2017). The majority of interviewed experts agree 
on the fact that ‘the state should not be responsible for increasing societal resilience. The 
most important role here should be played by business and civil society organizations. 
The state in this context has regulatory and controlling functions. 
There are only a few projects in Ukraine which are educating people though the media 
and advertisements on cyber and information security. Those projects mainly belong to 
banks which aim to raise awareness of how not to be become a victim of cyber crimes. 
Apart from banks, some NGOs and businesses invest in advertisements on social media 
about cyber security. Among them – Microsoft with the large project Onliandia, the aim 
of which is to raise awareness among children about secure use of the internet. The 
project is supported by a wide range of NGOs on children’s rights and education all over 
78 
 
Ukraine (Malchenyuk, 2017). The project teaches the basic ways to protect yourself on 
the internet through their website, social media accounts and social billboards. Another 
large project is run by the NGO Cyber Warta and Lviv State Administration. Apart from 
organizing classes and trainings for children on internet security Cyber Warta advocated 
for social billboards on internet security for children in Lviv and Kyiv. (Chayka, 2017). 
The main challenge of raising awareness programs through advertisements on the streets 
and social media campaigns is relatively high cost which small businesses or NGOs 
cannot afford. 
If talking about achieving societal cyber resilience through trainings and courses for 
targeted groups there are many initiatives of this kind held by businesses, NGOs and the 
state. ‘Even a simple training on cyber security which may last a day or two can give 
enough knowledge on how not to become a victim of cyber hackers’ (Radkevych, 2017). 
While there is a general agreement in society that such training is useful, the way they are 
conducted is contested by many experts. Some believe that the audience of such trainings 
should be divided by age and profession, while others may divide targeted audiences by 
their level of IT education and skills (Radkevych, 2017). Interestingly, the training which 
targets specific age groups or professions is usually organized by small businesses or 
NGOs which have an interest in training specific groups, for example, their staff. When 
training is targeted at people with different level of IT skills and for everyone interested 
in improving their knowledge of cyber security, they are organized by either large 
businesses such as Microsoft, Zillya, Bererzha Security or large NGOs which aim to 
achieve societal resilience among others (USAID, ISACA). According to experts, the 
state has to conduct trainings for civil servants since they usually ‘possess much more 
sensitive data than others and they are more likely to become a victim of hackers’ 
(Radkevych, 2017). After the recent cyber attacks in June and July 2017 the government 
is planning to invest more resources into cyber security trainings of civil servants. 
(Turchynov, 2017). 
The form in which cyber security training is provided also differs and depends on many 
factors. The most common form of cyber security trainings is webinar. Such a form is 
usually cheaper, more convenient for participants and if communicated well has a 
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potential to reach large audiences. The disadvantages of such a form of training is the fact 
that people tend to be less committed to an online form of learning and are more likely to 
give up webinars. Therefore, the classic form of trainings when participants stay in one 
place for a specific period of time, communicate and work together with a trainer still 
exists and is actively used by ISС project of USAID, ISACA, Zillya and others. 
While raising awareness on cyber security is important for increasing societal resilience 
to cyber threats it is complicated to evaluate their impact. Even though it is possible to 
calculate the number of people taking part in trainings or courses the number of people 
who have seen the billboards on the streets or posts on social media can be calculated 
only approximately. Furthermore, ‘it is difficult to measure with precision what affect an 
awareness raising activity has on an individual’ which often prevents donors from 
investing into such programs. (McElfroy, 2013). 
 
c) Conclusion 
 
Thus, societal cyber security awareness is equally important among other criteria in order 
to achieve cyber resilience on a national level since human error is very often the reason 
for cyber crimes and cyber attacks. After looking at education on information and cyber 
security in schools, Universities and general awareness programs the following 
challenges which prevent the country from achieving societal cyber resilience were 
identified: 
1. Not enough classes on internet security in primary schools which result in poor 
understanding of personal data protection, prevention of cyber bullying, viruses and 
fishing threats and others. 
2. Little attention is given to information security within Informatics class in 
secondary schools which results in little interest in pursuing careers in information and 
cyber security 
3. Absence of confidence of the government in private sector and private public 
partnerships 
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4. Low interest in private schools on cyber security which are not affordable for a 
significant amount of population  
5. Absence of cyber security specialty within the Ukrainian higher education system 
on both BA and MA levels which leads to the lack of experts in cyber security in Ukraine 
6. Relatively high cost of projects aimed at raising the general awareness of the 
population about cyber security through advertising on the streets and social media which 
prevents small businesses and NGOs from conducting them. 
7. Difficulty in measuring the impact of raising awareness campaigns which results 
in low interest of donors to invest in them. 
Thus, the societal resilience to cyber security threats does not exist in Ukraine which 
limits the cyber resilience on the national level in general. Primary and secondary 
education on cyber and information security does not equip people with the necessary 
skills and knowledge which would help them to protect themselves from cyber threats. At 
the same time, there are only a few projects which contribute to general awareness on 
cyber and information security run by businesses and NGOs, the majority of which are 
concentrated in few big cities. However, after the biggest cyber attacks in 2014-2017, the 
Ukrainian government and other stakeholders have committed to invest more resources 
into societal awareness on cyber security (Poroshenko, 2017; Turchynov, 2017). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
a) The results of process tracing case study 
The concept of resilience which is developed at the crossroads of physics, political 
science and economics has been used within the scope of this thesis to analyze the 
national policy of Ukraine in cyber security and identify whether Ukraine is a cyber 
resilient country and if not, what prevents it from becoming cyber resilient. Even though 
in political science scholars looked at resilience from different perspectives such as 
within the theory of good governance or humanitarian response all of them agree that 
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resilience’s added value lies in explaining the advantages of active self-organization in 
the events of crisis and ways to reorganize to rebound from a potentially catastrophic 
event as well as shift from responsibilities for security to different stakeholders (NGOs, 
businesses). These resilience features are applied also towards cyber space where the 
level of unpredictability and constant change is very high (Holling, 1973). Having this in 
mind, cyber resilience according to this research contains such criteria (independent 
variables) as efficient coordination and cooperation of all actors and stakeholders 
(Christou, 2016; Cavelty, 2008; Hagmann and Dunn Cavelty, 2012), vibrant civil society 
(Wagner, 2016; Bourbeau, 2013), private-public partnerships (World Bank, 2017) and 
cyber security education (Nickolas, 2016) which are necessary to efficiently respond to 
the changing nature of cyber threats. Particularly these four criteria are the basis of the 
causal mechanisms which were developed within the process tracing case study of 
Ukraine in order to test Ukrainian policy on cyber security on its correspondence to the 
emerging concept of resilience and identify the main challenges to providing cyber 
resilience in the country. 
Due to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the ongoing process of reforming and 
transforming of Ukraine after Euromaidan the issues related to the national cyber security 
of the country are challenged by a large number of cyber threats, including cyber attacks, 
cyber crimes, cyberespionage and sabotage. In such conditions, the cyber resilience of the 
country should be set as a priority of all stakeholders which are involved in cyber 
security. These stakeholders are the government, private sector and civil society.  
According to this process tracing case study, cyber resilience exists on the national level 
if the four causal mechanisms which involve the above mentioned stakeholders are fully 
proven. The challenges and issues which prevent the existence of cyber resilience on a 
national level are identified in case the causal mechanisms do not exist or exist only 
partially. 
The first causal mechanism is related to the government and reads as follows: 
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Due to the number of challenges to the element’s factors identified in the sixth chapter 
such as the absence of legislation, specifically a law of cyber security which would 
provide law enforcement and responsibility in case of violation of the law;  the events of 
duplication of work between some of the organs (State Security Service and National 
Police, State Security Service and SSSCIP); the fact that Complex System of Information 
Protection (CSIP) is outdated and does not fulfil its functions; the absence of indicators 
on state’s cyber security; the inefficiency of work SSCIP caused by low salaries paid to 
IT specialists and complexity of SSCIP structure; the absence of complex cyber security 
training which involves all stakeholders the causal mechanism of this process tracing case 
study has been proved only partially. Another reason which impedes the efficient 
cooperation and coordination on the state level in the sphere of cyber security and which 
relates not only to Ukraine, lies in the sensitivity of this sphere and the high volume of 
classified information which belongs to specific agencies such as State Security Service 
in Ukraine (Nojeim, 2010; Radkevych, 2017). 
The second causal mechanism is related to civil society and reads as follows: 
 
The analysis of the element’s factors proved that due to challenges such as the low 
number of cyber security NGOS; the scarcity of financial and human resources, - 
especially in the case of voluntary and grass-roots movements, independent think tanks 
and state-backed research institutes; decrease of volunteerism in the country caused by 
‘tiresome’ active volunteering during Euromaidan and the war in the East of Ukraine; a 
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large number of cyber trolls sponsored by Russians and separatists which undermine the 
activities of Ukrainian hacktivists such as Ukrainian Cyber Forces and Cyber Shield; 
constant change of political power and legislation in the areas of information and cyber 
security as well as the terms of work for non-governmental organizations; the ambitions 
of members of NGOs to take leadership positions rather than contribute to ongoing 
projects within their status; the absence of trust between the government and civil 
society; inefficiency of the work of state bodies which result in slow decision-making and 
response to recommendations or appeals of civil society organizations; and concentration 
of the work of civil society organization in the capital of the country, the element of the 
causal mechanism does not exist to the full extent.. Ukrainian civil society working on 
cyber security cannot be called vibrant. Efficient cooperation with the state exists only 
between state-backed research institutes. Other NGOs, think tanks and movements either 
failed to establish such cooperation or never tried to start it or are cooperating with state 
bodies however, experience the absence of trust to civil society and slow reaction to their 
proposals. Work with people aimed at raising awareness on cyber security issue seem to 
be fruitful, however the scope of their work is limited by the lack of resources both 
human and financial and other challenges mentioned above. Therefore, the causal 
mechanism can only be proved partially regarding some cooperation with the state and 
more active work with people. 
The third causal mechanism is related to businesses and reads as follows: 
 
The analysis of the element’s factors proved that cooperation between the state and 
businesses in the form of public-private partnerships does not exist in the cyber security 
sector in Ukraine on the official level. The cooperation between the state and businesses 
exists at the primitive level. From the state’s point of view there is interest in developing 
cooperation with business on the operational level mainly when it comes to attracting 
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additional financial resources due to the limited budget allocated to cyber security. On the 
strategic level on the other hand, state bodies do not involve businesses in decision-
making process, leaving the majority of them behind policy elaborations. From a business 
point of view there is little interest in establishing private-public partnerships with the 
state due to the inefficiency of work of state bodies caused by complicated and time-
consuming procedures of information sharing and other services; a low budget allocated 
to cyber security which leads to the search for the cheapest services rather than the ones 
of the best quality; low trust of businesses to state bodies which have a reputation of 
being corrupt and not open; fear that sharing of information with a state would end up in 
a one-way process; general skepticism about the state’s capacity to provide cyber security 
due to little investments in this sphere and lack of expertise; possible reputational risks in 
the event of success of a cyber attack targeted at the state. Thus, the sporadic events of 
cooperation between the state and businesses which in a few cases resembles the logic of 
private-public partnerships cannot prove the causal mechanism. 
The fourth causal mechanism is not related to all the stakeholders and touches upon the 
issue of societal resilience: 
 
 
The analysis of such element’s factors as cyber security education and awareness proved 
the absence of societal resilience in Ukraine which limits the resilience on the national 
level in general. Primary and secondary education on cyber and information security does 
not equip people with the necessary skills and knowledge which would help them to 
protect themselves from cyber threats. At the same time, there are only a few projects 
which contribute to general awareness of cyber and information security run by 
businesses and NGOs, the majority of which are concentrated in few big cities. The 
reasons for that lies in not enough classes on internet security in primary schools; little 
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attention given to information security within Informatics class in the secondary schools; 
the absence of confidence of the government in private sector and private public 
partnerships; low interest in private schools on cyber security which are not affordable 
for a significant amount of population; an absence of cyber security specialty within 
Ukrainian higher education system on both BA and MA levels; relatively high costs of 
projects aimed at raising general awareness of the population about cyber security 
through advertising on the streets and social media; and difficulty in measuring the 
impact of raising awareness campaigns in general. 
Therefore, the fact that the causal mechanisms of this process tracing case study were not 
proven implies that cyber resilience on a national level in Ukraine does not exist. The 
country thus remains prone to cyber threats at all levels due to the war in its Eastern part 
as well as the challenging process of reforms. The absence of efficient coordination of 
state bodies impedes smart decision-making on the state level regarding adopting relevant 
legislation and regulations, preventing and reacting to cyber threats. Little involvement of 
businesses in cooperation with the state leads to the lack of information sharing and 
expertise on both sides. Insufficient levels of development of civil society and lack of 
societal resilience in cyber security imply inability to protect, prevent and tackle the 
negative consequences of cyber crimes and attacks. 
b) Conceptual contribution of the research 
Since the concept of cyber resilience is very new and not sufficiently researched there is a 
great potential to find out its features and test its application in many cases starting from 
the government and ending with the human level. Ukraine’s experience with providing 
cyber security and resilience research within this process tracing case study also 
contributes to the wider conceptual understanding of cyber resilience. While the majority 
of researchers who look at cyber resilience stress the importance of engaging all 
stakeholders in preventing and tackling cyber risks (Christou, 2016; Cavelty; 2008); 
strengthening societal resilience and civil society (Nicholas, 2016; Hagmann and Dunn 
Cavelty, 2012) and achieving efficient cooperation and coordination of the state level 
regarding cyber security (Handmer and Dovers, 1996; Bourbeau; 2013; Pernik, 2015; 
Rhinaud, Sundelius, 2014), the empirical findings of the Ukrainian case proves that there 
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is a number of limitations to achieving all the above mentioned criteria. While some of 
those limitations may be considered  specifically Ukrainian given its high level of 
corruption and lack of transparency of the government (Transparency International, 
2017),the predominance of large businesses owned by oligarchs which impedes the 
existence of small and medium-sized businesses (Zaslavskiy, 2016), and young and 
comparatively weak civil society (Pekar, 2017), the following limitations are considered 
to be a general concern: 
Firstly, the sensitivity of the cyber security sphere and the high volume of classified 
information which belongs to specific agencies such as State Security Service in Ukraine 
impedes the efficient coordination and cooperation on the state level of many countries. 
Security Services either prohibit or unwilling to share some sensitive data with other 
agencies due to possible data leaks which may threaten the overall security of the country 
(Nojeim, 2010; Radkevych, 2017). 
Secondly, while the role of non-governmental organizations in providing cyber resilience 
is stressed within the majority of studies, limitations such as the lack of human and 
financial resources which has been proved in the case of Ukraine, is typical in other 
countries. Since the cyber security sphere is traditionally regarded to be the responsibility 
of the government, there is not much attention of experts and donors to NGOs working in 
this sphere.  Another factor which impedes the role of civil society in providing cyber 
security lies in the lack of cyber security volunteers. In order to volunteer for cyber 
security a person has to have good IT knowledge and skills, which prevents many people 
who are willing to dedicate their time to providing cyber resilience from becoming cyber 
security volunteers. Furthermore, volunteering culture in IT and cyber security is not 
developed well – there are quite few opportunities even for those IT specialists who are 
ready to volunteer in this sphere. It is proved that people tend to volunteer more in areas 
such as charities, religion, medical service (Bussel; Forbes, 2002). However, at the same 
time the rise of volunteerism can be expected in the event of the massive cyber attack or a 
conflict which within cyber space which affects a large part of the society. In Ukraine, 
the rise of volunteerism occurred after the country became involved in the war in the 
East. From the other hand, if the conflict is protracted or frozen there is a risk that 
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volunteerism activity may go down especially if no support is given to volunteers from 
the government or other donors.  
Thirdly, the existence of private public partnerships and overall more intense cooperation 
between the government and businesses is prevented by a number of reasons which relate 
not only to Ukrainian case. Governments are traditionally considered to be less flexible 
and more bureaucratic which results in complicated and time-consuming procedures of 
information sharing and other services. The private sector therefore, usually opts to avoid 
such bureaucratic state procedures.  There is also quite low trust of governments by 
businesses and fear that sharing of information with a state would end up as a one-way 
process. The majority of interviewees on this research as well as some researchers 
(Styran, 2017; Zhora, 2017; Cys-CERT Representative, 2017; Carr, 2017; Germano, 
2014; Rogers, 2016) expressed general skepticism about the state’s capacity to provide 
cyber security due to the lack of expertise. When deciding on cooperation with the 
government private sector also cares about the possible reputational risks in the event of a 
successful cyber attack targeted at the state.  
Fourthly, the fact that there is an ongoing discussion on how much society should be 
aware of cyber security limits the development societal resilience which has to be 
underlined as an integral factor needed to achieve cyber resilience on the national level 
(Pernik, 2016; Christou, 2016; Rhinaud, Sundelius, 2014). Even though all stakeholders 
to some extent are involved in educating or raising awareness on cyber security within 
society, their activity in this area is not prioritized in majority of cases. the interest of the 
stakeholders in this sphere is also relatively little also due to the difficulty in measuring 
the impact of raising awareness campaigns as well as education.  
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Table 1 
 
Date Author Target Description Attack Links 
    
1/2/201
5 Anonymous 
Ukrainian Law 
Enforcement and 
Justice Agencies 
Anonymos claimed to 
have successfulдy 
penetrated few 
Ukrainian Law 
Enforcement and 
Justice Agencies 
Targeted 
Attack 
     
7/16/20
15 Not known 
http://unicredit.u
a 
Cyphort Labs 
discovered a malware 
infection at the 
Ukrainian website of 
UniCredit bank: 
unicredit.ua. 
frame 
Injection 
http://www.cyph
ort.com/unicredit
-compromised/ 
    
7/30/20
15 
 
Ukraine 
ESET reveals that the 
Win32/Potao malware 
family has been used 
for the past five years 
in covert targeted 
attacks against the 
Ukrainian 
government, served 
up by a trojanized 
Targeted 
Attack 
http://www.infos
ecurity-
magazine.com/ne
ws/potao-trojan-
served-up-by-
russian/ 
    
100 
 
Russian version of 
encryption software 
TrueCrypt. 
8/18/20
15 CyberBerkut 
Unso.in.ua 
 
Dontsov-
nic.org.ua 
 
Pse3zub.org 
 
Ps-shop.com.ua 
 
Bilozerska.info 
 
Banderivec.ho.ua 
The Pro-Russia 
collective 
CyberBerkut takes 
down several 
Ukrainian sites DDoS 
http://m.tyzhden.
ua/news/115639 
    
12/24/2
015 
Russia 
according to 
Ukraine State 
Security 
Service(SSS, 
2017) 
Ukrainian 
Utilities 
The Ukrainian 
government blames 
power outages in the 
Western Ukraine on 
“hacker attacks by 
Russian special 
services”. According 
to the Security 
Service of Ukraine 
(SBU), malware has 
been found in the 
networks of some 
utilities. Moreover, 
these malware 
intrusions coincided 
Targeted 
Attack 
http://www.there
gister.co.uk/2015
/12/29/kiev_pow
er_outages_blam
ed_on_russian_h
ackers/ 
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with a “non-stop 
telephone flood at 
utility plants’ 
technical support 
departments”, 
according to local 
reports.The attack 
was performed by 
using Black energy 
program which 
brought Killdisc 
malware to the 
information system of 
the grid. It was 
reported that a 
number of documents, 
visual ad video 
materials were 
destroyed as a result 
of an attack thus 
giving the ground to 
claim that the attack 
on Prykarpattia power 
grid was also an act of 
cyber espionage. 
Furthermore, the 
attack on Prykarpattia 
power grid seem to 
represent the ‘first 
time since Stuxnet 
degraded Iran’s 
102 
 
uranium processing 
capability in 2010 that 
a cyber attack has 
been used to cause a 
physical 
outcome’(Vijagan, 
2016).  
The Ukrainian 
government blames 
power outages in the 
Western Ukraine on 
“hacker attacks by 
Russian special 
services”. According 
to the Security 
Service of Ukraine 
(SBU), malware has 
been found in the 
networks of some 
utilities. Moreover, 
these malware 
intrusions coincided 
with a “non-stop 
telephone flood at 
utility plants’ 
technical support 
departments”, 
according to local 
reports. 
1/5/201
6 
root AKA 
@ciadotgov   
allwomenstalk.co
m 
Root AKA 
@ciadotgov hacks Unknown 
http://siph0n.net/
exploits.php?id=
    
103 
 
allwomenstalk.com 
and dumps 136,938 
usernames and 
passwords. 
4358 
1/6/201
6 
Russia 
according to 
Ukraine State 
Security 
Service(SSS, 
2017) 
Ministry of 
Finance 
On December 6, 2016 
a cyber attack against 
Ministry of Finances 
took place with the 
aim to terminate 
budget process in 
Ukraine. Because of 
the attack payments 
and money transfers 
for million of UAH 
were terminated and 
slowed down. In 
order to fight with the 
consequences of the 
attack and prevent 
similar attacks in 
future Ukrainian 
government allocated 
40 mln of UAH to 
buy new computer 
and information 
systems. According to 
Ihor Malchenyuk, 
cyber security 
specialist from 
Microsoft Ukraine 
such actions will not 
Targeted 
Attack 
https://economics
.unian.ua/other/1
666452-minfin-
povidomiv-pro-
problemi-z-
platejami-
derjkaznacheystv
a-pislya-
hakerskoji-
ataki.html 
    
104 
 
prevent future cyber 
attacks. ‘Resources 
should rather be 
allocated into 
trainings of civil 
servants and IT 
specialist of new 
types of cyber threats 
as well strengthening 
exciting information 
systems with effective 
cyber security 
measures which 
would make an attack 
against government 
and country’s critical 
infrastructure costly 
and complicated.’ 
(Malchenyk, 2017) 
1/16/20
16 
Russia 
according to 
Ukraine State 
Security 
Service (SSS, 
2017) Kyiv Airport 
Ukrainian authorities 
announce to review 
the defences of 
government computer 
systems, after 
detecting a cyber 
attack on Kiev's main 
airport launched from 
a server in RussiaOn 
January 16, 2016 
there was a cyber 
attack against 
Targeted 
Attack 
http://uk.reuters.c
om/article/uk-
ukraine-
cybersecurity-
malware-
idUKKCN0UW0
S7 
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Ukrainian airport 
Boryspil. 
Blackenergy program 
was found on one of 
departments of the 
airport. However, due 
to the fact that the 
program was found 
before starting to 
spread to the whole 
information system of 
the airport no damage 
was done. The 
information security 
system of the airport 
was reviewed and is 
expected to be 
changed in order to be 
ready to cyber 
attacks. Similarly to 
other cyber attacks 
against Ukrainian 
critical infrastructure 
Russia is suspected to 
be an originator of the 
attacks, however the 
evidences are still 
need to be provided in 
order to prove it. 
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1/20/20
16 
Russia 
according to 
Ukraine State 
Security 
Service (SSS, 
2017) 
Ukrainian 
Utilities 
ESET reveals a new 
wave of cyber attacks 
against the Ukrainian 
electric power 
industry. 
Targeted 
Attack 
http://www.weliv
esecurity.com/20
16/01/20/new-
wave-attacks-
ukrainian-power-
industry/ 
    
5/18/20
16 Not known 
Anti Ukraine 
Government 
Separatists 
Researchers from 
ESET unveil the 
details of another 
cyberespionage 
operation in Ukraine: 
Operation Groundbait 
targeting anti-
governative 
separatists. 
Targeted 
Attack 
http://www.weliv
esecurity.com/20
16/05/18/ground
bait/ 
    
6/25/20
16 Not known 
Unnamed 
Ukrainian Bank 
Another hacks carried 
on via the SWIFT 
messaging system: 
this time hackers have 
stolen $10 million 
from an unnamed 
Ukrainian bank, 
according to an 
ISACA report. 
Targeted 
Attack 
https://www.kyiv
post.com/article/
content/ukraine-
politics/hackers-
steal-10-million-
from-a-
ukrainian-bank-
through-swift-
loophole-
417202.html 
    
9/3/201
6 Myrotvorets 
Ukrainian 
alleged pro-
Russian 
Journalists 
Myrotvorets, a group 
of Ukrainian 
nationalist hackers, 
leaks the personal 
details of local 
Account 
Hijacking 
http://news.softp
edia.com/news/pr
o-ukraine-
hackers-leak-
personal-details-
    
107 
 
journalists they 
consider pro-Russian 
for the second time in 
four months. 
of-ukrainian-and-
foreign-
journalists-
507926.shtml 
12/6/20
16 Not known 
State Treasury 
Service of 
Ukraine 
(treasury.gov.ua) 
and Ministry of 
Finance 
The Website of the 
State Treasury 
Service of Ukraine 
redirects the users to 
www.whoismrrobot.c
om. Also, the website 
of the Ministry of 
Finance of Ukraine 
experiences a service 
disruption. 
DNS 
Hijacking 
http://uaposition.
com/latest-
news/ukraine-
state-treasurys-
website-hacked/ 
    
12/13/2
016 Not known 
Ukraine's 
defence ministry 
Ukraine's defence 
ministry says that its 
website is down due 
to cyber attacks that 
appeared aimed at 
disrupting it giving 
updates on the pro-
Russian separatist 
conflict in eastern 
regions. DDoS 
http://www.reute
rs.com/article/us-
ukraine-crisis-
cyber-
idUSKBN1421Y
T 
    
12/15/2
016 BlackEnergy Ukrainian Banks 
ESET reports that 
BlackEnergy, the 
same group who 
targeted Ukrainian 
utilities last 
December has been 
Targeted 
Attack 
http://www.there
gister.co.uk/2016
/12/15/ukraine_b
anks_apt/ 
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using the TeleBots 
malware against 
Ukrainian banks in 
the last month. 
12/20/2
016 Not known 
Kiev's Power 
Grid 
Ukraine investigates a 
suspected cyber 
attack on Kiev's 
power grid at the 
weekend, the latest in 
a series of strikes on 
its energy and 
financial 
infrastructure 
Targeted 
Attack 
http://www.reute
rs.com/article/us-
ukraine-crisis-
cyber-attacks-
idUSKBN1491Z
F 
    
12/23/2
016 
Fancy Bear 
(APT28) 
Ukrainian 
Artillery Units 
Fancy Bear, the 
hacker group 
previously linked to 
the Russian Military 
Intelligence (GRU), is 
believed to have 
deployed malware on 
Android devices to 
track and target 
Ukrainian artillery 
units over the past 
two years. 
Targeted 
Attack 
http://www.ibtim
es.co.uk/russian-
hackers-
deployed-
android-
malware-track-
target-ukrainian-
artillery-units-
1597834 
     
Source: Anna Melenchuk and Piret Pernik (2017) 
 
Table 3 Entrance campaign to Ukrainian Universities; Information security 
specialty in 2014. 
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Source (Ministry of education, 2017) 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 
Interviewees: 
Government 
1. Zolotukhin Dmytro, Deputy Minister of information of Ukraine 
2. Dmytro Dubov, Expert of National Institute of Strategic Studies, was involved in 
drafting Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine 
3. Former representative of SSSCIP (State Service of Special Communication and 
Information Protection), anonymous. 
Business 
1. Viktor Zhora, director ‘Infosafe Ukraine’ 
2. Ihor Malchenyuk, Microsoft Ukraine 
3. Vladyslav Styran, director ‘Berezha Security’ 
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Civil society 
1. Lilia Oleksiuk, Head of the Association of Ukrainian NGOs ‘Information security 
and information technologies’ 
2. Kateryna Chaika, founder of ‘Cyber Warta’ NGO 
3. Mykola Konstynian, Civil society cyber security trainer 
4. Andrey Rybalchenko, International NGO ‘ASACA’ member 
5. Eugene Dokunin, founder of Ukrainian Cyber Forces 
6. ‘Cyber Shield’ NGO representative (anonymous) 
 
International organizations 
1. Nadia Khvan, OSCE Programme Officer 
2. OSCE cyber security officer, anonymous 
 
Experts, think tanks 
1. Kenneth Geers, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence Ambassador 
2. Henry Roigas, Project Manager at NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence 
3. Piret Pernik, Research Fellow of International center of security and defence in 
Estonia 
4. Serhiy Radkevych, Expert at Center for Research of Army, Conversion and 
Disarmament 
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Appendix 5 
 
Topics and questions discussed with interviewees: 
• Introduction to resilience concept in international relations. In your opinion does 
Ukrainian efforts in cyber security correspond to this concept’s criteria? 
• Which issues related to cyber resilience Ukraine faced in 2014-2016? Which of 
such issues your organization/institution is addressing or can address? 
• Which projects are targeted at cyber resilience in your respective organization? 
• How would you evaluate the role of civil society and businesses in providing 
cyber security in Ukraine? Is community-based approach to security used? Are Ukrainian 
citizens cyber resilient? 
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